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MONEY LAUNDERING AND LAWYERS
Eugene R. Gaetket
Sarah N. Wellingl
INTRODUCTION
The federal government has recently enacted money laundering
laws to track and discourage the use of money generated by crime.
Because some of that money is used to pay legal fees, the laws have a
direct impact on lawyers. The laws increase the risk of prosecution
for lawyers, inhibit some methods of fee payment, and make some
cases less attractive financially. Generally, the laws make law practice
more complicated and risky.
The laws have been criticized for their impact on criminal de-
fense lawyers. Critics have raised three broad objections. The first
objection is constitutional. Critics have also objected to the laws on
ethical grounds, claiming that they force lawyers to act unethically.
The third objection is based on the practical impact of the laws. Crit-
ics claim the laws "chill" the relationship between lawyers and cli-
ents, drive some lawyers out of criminal work, and give prosecutors
too much power to disqualify defense lawyers.
The constitutional questions have so far been resolved in favor of
the government, but objections to the money laundering laws on the
other two grounds need to be examined. Although the laws are con-
stitutional as applied to criminal defense lawyers, the question re-
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mains whether that application is wise. Based on the laws' ethical and
practical impact, many claim that it is not.
Nowhere in the literature have the laundering laws been ana-
lyzed in terms of their collective impact on criminal defense lawyers.I
1. The criminally derived property statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1988), has received
little attention in law reviews. A comprehensive analysis appears in D. Randall Johnson,
The Criminally Derived Property Statute: Constitutional and Interpretive Issues Raised by
18 U.S.C. § 1957, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1291 (1993). A shorter discussion is found
in G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the '90"s, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
149 (1989). Lawyers' liability under § 1957 has generated some analysis, mostly in the
form of student notes arguing that liability would violate the Sixth Amendment. See,
e.g., Lynne D. Boylston, Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986: Further Erosion of Criminal Defense Advocacy, 21 GA. L. REV. 929 (1987); Adam
K. Weinstein, Note, Prosecuting Attorneys for Money Laundering: A New and Questiona-
ble Weapon in the War on Crime, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369 (Winter 1988); Paul
G. Wolfteich, Note, Making Criminal Defense a Crime Under 18 U.S. C. Section 1957, 41
VAND. L. REV. 843 (1988). Cf. Kathleen F. Brickey, Tainted Assets and the Right to
Counsel- The Money Laundering Conundrum, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 61 (1988) [herein-
after Brickey, Tainted Assets] (attorney liability would not violate the Sixth Amendment).
Since Congress added the Sixth Amendment exemption for lawyers in 1988, only one
author has written on lawyers' liability. See Alan J. Jacobs, Note, Indirect Deprivation of
the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Prospective Prosecution of Criminal Defense Attor-
neys for 'Money Laundering, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 303 (1989).
The cash reporting requirement, I.R.C. § 60501 (1988), has received less attention in
law reviews. A recent discussion is found in Ellen S. Podgor, Form 8300: The Demise of
Law as a Profession, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 485 (1992); Patricia T. Morgan, Money
Laundering, the Internal Revenue Service and Enforcement Priorities, 43 FLA. L. REV.
939 (1991). It is mentioned very briefly in Brickey, Tainted Assets, supra, at 48, and
Robert C. Bonner, A Balanced Perspective on Attorney Subpoenas, 36 EMORY L.J. 803,
807-08 (1987) (Symposium on Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client Relation-
ship). The requirement is treated in more detail in David F. DuMouchel & Cynthia J.H.
Oberg, Defense Attorney Fees: A New Tool for the Prosecution, 1986 DET. C.L. REV. 57.
Forfeiture of assets generally has also received some attention in law reviews. See,
e.g., Brent Fisse, Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime: Funny Money, Serious Legislation, 13
CRIM. L.J. 368 (1989); Michael Goldsmith & Mark J. Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and
Third Party Rights: The Need for Further Law Reform, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1254; Lalit K.
Loomba, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 471 (1989); David McClean, Seiz-
ing the Proceeds of Crime: The State of the Art, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 334 (1989); Nick
H. Varsam, Assets Held Hostage: Pretrial Restraint of Third-Party Property Under Crimi-
nal RICO, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 1187 (1989); Sean D. Smith, Note, The Scope of Real
Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related Crimes Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 303 (1988); Michael Schecter, Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture
Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1990) (civil forfeiture).
Forfeiture of attorneys' fees has prompted a tidal wave of ink. Lists of the articles
are easy to find. See, e.g., Note, Attorney Fee Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfei-
ture Act of 1984: If It Works, Don't Fix It, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 535, 537 n.23
(1988). Thoughtful analyses include Kathleen F. Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees:
The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493
1166
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This article does that analysis. It begins by examining how the federal
money laundering laws apply to criminal defense lawyers when they
receive fees for their work. The article then explores whether and
how the laws cause criminal defense lawyers to act unethically. The
article next analyzes the practical impact of the laws on these lawyers.
This article concludes that while the ethical criticisms of the laws are
largely unfounded, there is legitimate, though as yet undocumented,
concern about their practical impact on our criminal justice system.
(1986) [hereinafter Brickey, Forfeiture], and Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys'
Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights,
1987 Wis. L. REV. 1. See generally Symposium, Government Intrusion into the Attorney-
Client Relationship, 36 EMORY L.J. 755 (1987).
Most of this writing on fee forfeiture is now out of date because it focuses on issues
resolved by two Supreme Court cases, United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989),
and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989), discussed infra
in notes 58-60 and accompanying text. Aside from some case notes, see, e.g., Avalyn Y.
Castillo, Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys Fees: The Rights Remaining to the Accused and his
Attorney after Caplin & Drysdale and U.S. v. Monsanto, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123 (1990);
Steve Dettelbach, Note, Forfeiting the Right to Counsel, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 201
(1990); Melinda Hardy, Note, Sixth Amendment - Applicability of Right to Counsel of
Choice to Forfeiture of Attorneys'Fees, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1154 (1990), no
law review has considered fee forfeiture in the wake of the Supreme Court cases. See,
Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35 (1992);
Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of the
Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670 (1992). Only two articles have appeared in
legal magazines and newspapers. See, e.g., Barry Tarlow, Fee Forfeiture: Apocalypse Now
or Business as Usual?, TRIAL Apr. 1990, at 44; Whitney Adams, Fees, Forfeiture and the
Attorney-Client Relationship, Crim. Practice Manual (BNA) No. 57, at 151:301 (Dec. 12,
1990). On the international possibilities, see Richard J. Wilson, Human Rights and
Money Laundering: The Prospect of International Seizure of Defense Attorney Fees, 3
CRIM. L. F. 85 (1991).
Nowhere have the laundering laws been analyzed collectively in terms of their im-
pact on lawyers. Some authors have provided a partial analysis. See DuMouchel &
Oberg, supra (discussing the cash reporting requirement and fee forfeiture); Boylston,
supra (discussing the criminally derived property statute and fee forfeiture); Jacobs, supra
(same). Professor Brickey brings the laundering laws together, see Brickey, Tainted As-
sets, supra, at 47-49, but this article preceded the significant changes of 1988 (the Sixth
Amendment exception added to § 1957 and the Supreme Court's decisions on fee forfei-
ture). Finally, the practice-oriented literature includes two pieces which discuss the three
money laundering laws as applied to lawyers. See Adams, supra; RICO CASES COMMIT-
TEE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROTECTING YOURSELF AND YOUR FEE: A DEFENSE
LAWYER'S PRACTICE GUIDE IN A NEW AGE OF FEDERAL LAW, (1991) (hereinafter
ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE). Both of these are intended primarily for defense law-
yers, to help them avoid trouble with the money laundering laws. Both are very good.
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I. THE MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS AND THEIR APPLICATION
TO LAWYERS
Three money laundering laws apply to lawyers in their work. 2
They are 18 U.S.C. § 1957, I.R.C. § 60501, and the criminal forfeiture
laws. 3
A. Section 1957-Criminally Derived Property
Section 1957 basically makes it criminal to engage knowingly in
a financial transaction with money generated by certain crimes.4 The
point of the crime is to exclude dirty money from the financial system.
The statute was adopted in 1986 as part of a package to make money
laundering a substantive crime.5 The sanctions are vigorous, includ-
ing imprisonment up to 10 years, 6 fines up to twice the amount in-
volved or $250,000, 7 and forfeiture of all property involved in the
offense or traceable to property involved in the offense.8
Section 1957 provides: "Whoever ... knowingly engages or at-
tempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived
property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from
specified unlawful activity, shall be punished .... -9 The conduct
element requires the defendant to engage or attempt to engage in a
2. A fourth money laundering law, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, is sometimes implicated when
criminal defense lawyers are paid their fees. For example, § 1956 is implicated when an
attorney is hired by one who has committed specified unlawful activity who pays the
attorney to represent a third person who might be a subordinate of the payor. In this fact
scenario, the subordinate/client's legal expenses are being assumed by the criminal organ-
ization and the payment of the legal fee might be viewed as a financial transaction pro-
moting the specified unlawful activity. To the extent that the lawyer "knowingly"
accepts this fee with the stated purpose of promoting the unlawful activity of the organi-
zation by ensuring that the subordinate refuses to cooperate with the government, she
may violate § 1956. We have decided not to include § 1956 in this article because it is
implicated less frequently than the three laws we focus on.
3. The criminal forfeiture laws are cited infra in note 48. These laws can be grouped
together and characterized as money laundering laws because they are all part of the
government's effort in the last decade to track and disable money generated by crime.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Supp. 1993) ("Engaging in monetary transactions in prop-
erty derived from specified unlawful activity.").
5. Section 1957 was adopted along with 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988) ("Laundering of
monetary instruments") as part of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, § 1351,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (Supp. 1993).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b)(1) (1993).
7. Id. at § 1957(b). The fine referred to in (b)(1) is listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988)
as $250,000.
8. See id. § 982 (criminal forfeiture); id § 981 (civil forfeiture).
9. Id. § 1957(a).
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monetary transaction, although "engage" is not defined in the stat-
ute.10 "Monetary transaction" is defined broadly to include most
transactions at financial institutions." The property involved in the
transaction must have a value over $10,000,12 and it must be derived
from "specified unlawful activity," which includes a long list of
crimes.' 3 Finally, there are jurisdictional elements. The monetary
transaction must affect interstate commerce, 14 and the offense must
occur in the United States or the defendant must be a United States
person. Is
The mental element requires the defendant to engage in the
transaction knowing the property is worth over $10,000 and is crimi-
nally derived. "Criminally derived property" is defined as property
derived from any criminal offense.' 6 This mens rea gives the crime a
two-tiered character because the property involved must actually be
derived from certain listed crimes, but the defendant need only know
that the property was derived from crime generally.' 7
10. Cf id. § 1956(a)(1) & (3). These sub-sections of section 1956 prohibit "con-
ducting" certain financial transactions. The term "conducts" is defined at section
1956(c)(2). Section 1957 prohibits "engaging" in transactions, and "engaging" is not
defined. The relationship between conducting and engaging is uncertain, and the legisla-
tive history does not help.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (Supp. 1993) ("the term 'monetary transaction' means
the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange... of funds or a monetary instrument...
by, through, or to a financial institution.., including any.., financial transaction under
section 1956(c)(4)(B) .... "). "Monetary instruments" include cash, travelers' checks,
personal checks, bank checks, money orders, investment securities in bearer form and
negotiable instruments in bearer form. Id. § 1956(c)(5). "Financial institutions" include
banks, securities broker/dealers, currency exchanges, travelers' check and money order
companies, and the U.S. Postal Service, among others. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(6) (Supp.
1993).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988).
13. Section 1957(f)(3) refers to specified unlawful activity as it is defined in
§ 1956(c)(7). That section lists all federal offenses which are RICO predicates (except
Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements), all federal drug felonies, all foreign drug felo-
nies, and a list of miscellaneous bribery, white collar, fraud, environmental, export con-
trol, and espionage crimes.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (1988).
15. See id. § 1957(d). "U.S. person" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3077(2) (1988) basi-
cally to include United States nationals, resident aliens, and all persons and business enti-
ties within the United States.
16. See id. § 1957(f)(2).
17. And the defendant need not think the property was generated by a felony; it is
sufficient if the defendant thinks it was generated by a misdemeanor. See id. § 1957(f)(2)
("a criminal offense"); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-105.400
(1988) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
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Several features of this crime are novel. One is the two-tiered
character just described. Another is that receiving criminally-derived
property is not prohibited, but using it in financial transactions is.18
Also, the statute relies on an explicit numerical minimum of $10,000
to limit its application to significant transactions. 19 Finally, the most
novel feature is the law's imposition of heavy criminal penalties on
persons who knowingly provide goods and services in exchange for
"dirty money" but have no intent to promote the underlying criminal
activity.20
Section 1957 could apply to lawyers depositing fees they knew
their clients had generated by crime. Congress was aware of this ap-
plication and originally intended to allow it.21 Two years later, how-
ever, Congress amended the statute to exclude some lawyers' fees.22
The amendment states that the definition of monetary transaction
"does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person's
right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
18. Satisfaction of the financial transaction element is predictable, however. Section
1957 only applies to amounts over $10,000. With such large sums, a normal receiver is
unlikely to do anything but deposit it in a "financial institution" as defined in the statute.
See supra note 11.
19. The reporting requirements use a numerical threshold of $10,000. See, e.g., 31
U.S.C. §§ 5313 & 5316 (1984); I.R.C. § 60501. The purpose for these reporting statutes
is to filter out reports of small cash transactions, which are not suspicious. The numerical
threshold in the substantive crime defined in section 1957 is unusual in that the $10,000
line defines not merely how serious a crime the conduct is, but whether it is criminal at
all.
20. Before the adoption of section 1957, persons who knowingly provided goods or
services to criminals and were paid with criminally derived money were liable, if at all,
only as accomplices or conspirators on the underlying crime. The one exception to this
arose in cases where the money was criminally derived because it was stolen. In that
situation, providers who were paid with the stolen money could be charged with receipt
of stolen property. The question of whether to hold providers liable as accomplices when
they acted with knowledge but no intent to further the underlying crime has troubled the
courts. See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943); United States v.
Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940); Strafer, supra note 1, at 151-53. Sometimes courts found
ways to let the defendant off. See, e.g., People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967). Section 1957 takes a different approach and defines the knowing deposit of dirty
money itself as a substantive crime rather than a basis on which to hold the defendant
liable as an accomplice. Congress surely has the power to take this approach, but it is a
dramatic expansion of substantive criminal liability.
21. See Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 849. But cf Weinstein, supra note 1, at 376
(legislative history "ambiguous" as to congressional intent); Jacobs, supra note 1, at 344
(Congress had "no clear intent" on attorney liability). The Wolfteich analysis is the more
persuasive.
22. See Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, §§ 6181-6187, 102 Stat. 4354 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1957).
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Constitution .... "23
This is a curious amendment. Apparently it responds to con-
cerns about the constitutionality of prosecuting criminal defense law-
yers. 24 Yet to announce that the statute is limited by the Constitution
is not news. If the statute intrudes on the Sixth Amendment, courts
would be bound to dismiss prosecutions anyway. Congress's purpose
in adopting this amendment must have been not so much to make a
substantive change in the law but rather to make a political statement,
to signal its concern about the constitutional implications of prosecut-
ing criminal defense lawyers.25
The reach of this statutory exception for lawyers should not be
overstated. Because it is keyed to the Sixth Amendment, which gen-
erally does not attach until indictment, 26 the exception does not apply
until then. A criminal defense lawyer who deposits tainted fees from
an unindicted client may not be protected by the exception.27 Thus
even with the amendment, section 1957 could apply to defense law-
yers who deposit their fees.
Any constitutional objections to section 1957 based on the cli-
ent's right to counsel presumably have been obviated by this excep-
tion. Congress added to the statute. More importantly, one year after
the statutory exception was adopted, the Supreme Court decided the
two forfeiture cases which limit defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (1988).
24. Some writers had concluded that prosecuting attorneys under § 1957 would be
unconstitutional. See, eg., Weinstein, supra note 1, at 386. But see Brickey, Tainted
Assets, supra note 1, at 61 (attorney liability would not violate the Sixth Amendment);
Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 861; Jacobs, supra note 1, at 310.
25. One writer suggests the amendment reflects Congress' intent that the limits in
the Department of Justice draft guidelines be read as part of the statute. See Jacobs,
supra note 1, at 347. This is an interesting idea. However, the guidelines finally adopted
differed from the draft guidelines Congress had before it when it passed the 1988 amend-
ment. Compare the draft guidelines, reprinted in Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 870 with the
final guidelines, DOJ MANUAL, supra note 17, at 9-105.000 to .800, discussed infra in
notes 30-37 and accompanying text. Therefore, the idea that Congress relied on the draft
guidelines is helpful in defining Congress's intent, but it does not mean that Congress's
intent is consistent with the Department of Justice guidelines in effect today.
26. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 191 (1984).
27. See generally Brickey, Tainted Assets, supra note 1, at 61 ("A generalized con-
cern that a suspect would be better off if he were represented by counsel while under
investigation simply does not implicate sixth amendment rights.").
Moreover, because the § 1957 amendment is keyed to the Sixth Amendment, some
writers believe that the forfeiture cases, Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, render the
exception meaningless.
1992] 1171
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Because the section 1957 exception is keyed to the Sixth Amendment,
many writers believe that the forfeiture cases render the exception
meaningless. 28 No other constitutional challenges to section 1957
have been successful. 29
The Department of Justice has adopted internal guidelines which
also limit the use of section 1957 against lawyers.30 As a threshold,
these guidelines require that the property transferred to the lawyer be
a bona fide fee, not a sham designed to hide the property. 31 If this
condition is met, the Department of Justice will only prosecute law-
yers who have actual knowledge that the fee was generated by crime,
even if the lack of actual knowledge is due to the lawyer's willful
blindness. 32 The lawyer's actual knowledge cannot come from confi-
dential lawyer-client communications or the lawyer's own efforts in
the course of representing the client.33 Practically, the lawyer's
knowledge will need to have existed before the representation began.34
The relevant time for determining the lawyer's knowledge is the time
of the financial transaction, not the time the fee is received. 35 Finally,
the Justice Department says it will not inform a lawyer that the fee
may be criminally derived solely for the purpose of giving that lawyer
the forbidden actual knowledge.36 These guidelines restrict the fac-
tors on which the Department of Justice will rely in deciding to prose-
cute lawyers, but their impact is uncertain. The guidelines are not
binding on the Department, 37 and they only apply to the decision to
28. See, e.g., ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 1, at 3. On the other hand,
it can be argued that Congress intended to alter the 1957 statute in accord with the Sixth
Amendment as it existed at the time, and subsequent changes in the scope of the Sixth
Amendment are irrelevant to its legislative intent.
29. No reported cases have sustained constitutional challenges to section 1957. See
generally Randall, supra note 1, at 1341-65.
30. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 17, at 9-105.600.
31. Id. at 9-105.610.
32. Id. at 9-105.620. Other defendants would be liable under a willful blindness
theory. Id. at 9-105.500. "Willful blindness" is a doctrine which allows the government
to prove the defendant's guilty knowledge by showing conscious avoidance of knowledge,
or "ostrich-like" behavior. See generally United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.)
(en bane), cert denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Crimi-
nal Culpability, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 1351 (1992); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction:
Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191
(1990).
33. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 17, at 9-105.600.
34. See id. at 9-105.630.
35. Id. at 9-105.400.
36. Id. at 9-105.700.
37. Id. at 9-105.700 ("This policy statement is not intended to create or confer any
1172 [Vol. 43:1165
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prosecute, not to the prosecution itself.38
These two restrictions on section 1957's application to lawyers,
the statutory Sixth Amendment exception and the Department of Jus-
tice's internal guidelines, are doubtful in their reach and effect. The
statutory Sixth Amendment exception to the extent it has any mean-
ing in the wake of the forfeiture cases, probably applies only to law-
yers whose clients have been indicted. The Department of Justice
guidelines are not enforceable. Section 1957 may still be applied to
criminal defense lawyers who are paid with criminally-derived funds.
B. Section 60501 - Reports of Cash Transactions
Section 60501 requires persons to report to the Internal Revenue
Service cash payments they receive in their trade or business if the
payments are over $10,000. 39 Sanctions for failure to report section
60501 transactions are robust. Criminal penalties include imprison-
ment up to five years and fines;40 civil penalties are also available.41
The section 60501 reporting obligation clearly extends to lawyers
rights, privileges, or benefits on prospective or actual witnesses or defendants. Nor is it
intended to have the force of law or of a United States Department of Justice directive.")
(citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979)).
38. Adams, supra note 1, at 151:305 (guidelines govern only decision to prosecute,
not trial strategy).
39. I.R.C. § 60501(a) (1988) ("Any person - (1) who is engaged in a trade or busi-
ness, and (2) who, in the course of such trade or business, receives more than $10,000 in
cash in 1 transaction (or 2 or more related transactions), shall make the return described
in subsection (b) . . . ."). This statute was adopted to close a loophole in the currency
reporting laws. The other federal reporting laws, adopted in 1970, require reports of all
cash transactions over $10,000 at financial institutions. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1988). and
reports of cash and bearer financial instruments over $10,000 that are imported to or
exported from the U.S. Id. § 5316. Section 60501 was adopted in 1984 to reach large
cash payments for goods and services. For example, section 60501 requires a report if
cars, jewelry, or gold are purchased with cash. See Treas. Reg. § 1.60501-1(c)(1) (1992).
See also id. § 1.60501-l(c)(1)(vii) (examples 1-3). Together, the three reporting require-
ments mean that the government is informed of basically all large cash transactions.
40. Fines can be $250,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571. This is the sanction for failure to
report or to supply information. Sanctions for filing a false § 60501 return are imprison-
ment up to 3 years and fines of $100,000 for individuals, $500,000 for corporations. Id.;
18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988). And, of course, these maximum sanctions are affected by the
sentencing guidelines.
It is unclear whether the sanctions of I.R.C. § 7201 (tax evasion) apply to § 60501
filings because those filings do not involve any tax liability.
41. Civil sanctions are a $50 penalty for each failure to file. I.R.C. § 6721(a). For
intentional failure to file the report required by § 60501, the penalty is the greater of 10%
of the aggregate amount of the items which were required to be reported or 10% of the
taxable income derived on the transaction. Id. § 6721(b).
Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 43:1165
who receive cash fees over $10,000. In fact, the section 60501 regula-
tions use a lawyer as an example.42 Information required on the re-
porting form includes the name, address and taxpayer identification
number of the payor and the lawyer, the name, address and taxpayer
identification number of the client if the fee is paid by a third party,
the amount of cash, the amount paid in denominations of $100 bills or
larger, and the date and nature of the transaction.43
Lawyers have argued that compelling the disclosure of clients'
identities, the fact that clients paid cash, and the amount of cash is
unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 44 These
42. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050I-l(e)(7)(iii) (example 2) (1992) ("An attorney agrees to
represent a client in a criminal case with the attorney's fee to be determined on an hourly
basis. In the first month in which the attorney represents the client, the bill for the attor-
ney's services comes to $8000 which the client pays in cash. In the second month in
which the attorney represents the client, the bill for the attorney's services comes to
$4000, which the client again pays in cash. The aggregate amount of cash paid ($12,000)
relates to a single transaction. . ., the sale of legal services relating to the criminal case,
and the receipt of cash must be reported under this section.").
43. Reporting under § 60501 is accomplished by filing IRS Form 8300. A copy of
Form 8300 is included as an appendix.
44. United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1991).
This case has an interesting history. Lawyers objecting to the forms had filed them
but omitted all information that identified the client. See Alexander Stille, Both Sides
Claim Disclosure Win, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 26, 1990 at 32; Richard L. Fricker, Doing Time:
Fight Over Fee Disclosure Lands Five Lawyers in Tulsa Jail, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 24.
The IRS's initial policy until 1989 was not to pursue lawyers who filed incomplete forms.
See Linda P. Campbell & William Grady, Drug War Targets Defense Lawyers, CHI.
TRIB., May 20, 1990, § 1, at 25; David F. Axelrod & Steven M. Harris, The Perils of
Getting Paid in Cash, CRIM. JUST., Winter, 1989, at 6, 42. In 1989, the IRS changed its
policy. See Laurie P. Cohen & Richard B. Schmitt, Legal Beat: IRS Presses Lawyers on
Clients Using Cash, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1989, at B9; Stille, supra; Campbell & Grady,
supra. As part of an IRS effort dubbed "Attorneys Project," some 950 computer-gener-
ated letters were directed to lawyers nationwide regarding 2,400 Form 8300's that failed
to identify the payor of the cash. U.S. Moves Against Lawyers in Cash Transaction Cases,
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 6 Current Reports No. 4, at 83 (Mar. 28,
1990) [hereinafter ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual]; Stille, supra. Subsequently, subpoenas
were issued to approximately 90 of these lawyers to obtain testimony regarding the infor-
mation not reported in the Form 8300s. ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual, supra, 6 Current
Reports No. 4, at 84 (Mar. 28, 1990).
Ultimately, the IRS filed summons enforcement actions against two law firms. See
United States v. Fischetti, No. M-18-304 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1989)(VLB) (Order to Show
Cause). This case involved the failure of a law firm to submit a complete 8300 form.
During the lawsuit, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)
and other interested parties submitted an amicus brief which argued that § 60501 created
constitutional dilemmas for lawyers. Amici alleged that complying with § 60501 would
violate a client's Sixth Amendment rights in three ways. First, it was alleged that the
report would interfere with the client's ability to retain counsel by discouraging a cash-
paying client from retaining a lawyer out of fear that the government would then investi-
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constitutional challenges have been rejected,45 however, so the report-
ing requirements of section 60501 are important to lawyers.46
C. Criminal Forfeiture of Fees
Forfeiture laws pose a different kind of risk for lawyers, a risk
more like civil than criminal liability. The risk is that the lawyer will
have to give up money earned as a fee.
The criminal forfeiture laws provide that with certain crimes, the
defendant may have to forfeit property involved in the crime.47 This
gate. Furthermore, § 60501 was said to discourage the free and open communication that
is necessary between a lawyer and client. The client will not be willing to communicate
fully with the lawyer when the client knows that the government will receive detailed
information about the client from the 8300 form. Finally, the Sixth Amendment was
claimed to be implicated because § 60501 destroys the lawyer-client relationship through
the disqualification of the choice of counsel. Prosecutors who learned that opposing law-
yers had submitted 8300 forms would designate these lawyers as government witnesses,
subpoena them to testify, and then attempt to disqualify them from any further represen-
tation of their clients.
The amici also contended that § 60501 violated the Fifth Amendment. First, they
claimed that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process includes a client's right to
effective representation of counsel and that § 60501 interferes with effective assistance by
damaging the lawyer-client relationship as described above. Second, the amici alleged
that compelling the lawyer to supply information about the client may implicate the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The amici gave the examples of client
identity and fee amounts as examples of information on Form 8300 which is potentially
incriminating. The amici further argued that disclosure of a client's identity may be rele-
vant to criminal forfeiture and other federal offenses. For example, evidence of fee pay-
ments may alert prosecutors to argue that these payments are proceeds of illegal activity.
The final Fifth Amendment argument was that if the client cannot be compelled to pro-
duce the information, the lawyer cannot be compelled to produce the information either.
Otherwise, the government could make an "end run" around the Fifth Amendment by
making the lawyer disclose information that could not be compelled from the client. Id.
at 25-47.
The trial judge ordered the lawyers to complete the reporting form. United States v.
Fischetti, No. M-18-304 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1990).
45. See Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d at 501.
46. The Department of Justice does not plan to give lawyers special treatment under
section 60501. See Letter from James A. Bruton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Tax Division, to Michael S. Ross, Chair, ABA Grand Jury Committee (Sept. 7, 1990) (on
file with the authors).
47. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 982 & 1963 (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988). These forfeiture
statutes differ some in their definitions of what property is subject to forfeiture. Basically,
§ 982(a)(1) allows forfeiture of any property, real or personal, involved in the offense and
any property traceable to such property; § 1963(a) allows forfeiture of any interest ac-
quired or maintained in violation of RICO, any interest in the enterprise, and all proceeds
of RICO violations; and § 853(a) allows forfeiture of all proceeds of violations, direct and
indirect, all property used or intended to be used to facilitate violations, and any interest
in a continuing criminal enterprise. Aside from these and some other insignificant differ-
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forfeiture is in addition to the regular sanctions of fines and imprison-
ment.48 Crimes which allow forfeiture are RICO, 49 drug felonies,50
money laundering,51 and various bank fraud and corruption crimes.
5 2
The forfeiture laws include provisions designed to stop defend-
ants from dissipating or hiding the tainted assets.5 3 A "relation back"
clause states that the forfeited assets belong to the government as of
the date the crime was committed.54 Assets in the defendant's hands
may be restrained before conviction. 55 A "substitute assets" clause
allows the government to confiscate the defendant's clean assets if the
defendant hid, commingled or diminished the dirty ones.56 Finally,
assets the defendant has transferred to third parties may be seized
from the third parties.57
Among the third parties who may suffer forfeiture are the de-
fendant's lawyers. The Supreme Court has ruled that these criminal
forfeiture laws apply to lawyers' fees and that forfeiture of fees is con-
stitutional. 58 To the extent a defendant pays a lawyer with forfeitable
ences, the three forfeiture statutes are similar. Hereafter we will rely primarily on the
drug forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853.
The history and operation of the criminal forfeiture laws are thoroughly discussed in
Brickey, Forfeiture, supra note 1, and William J. Hughes & Edward H. O'Connell, Jr., In
Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh
English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 613 (1984).
48. Congress hopes that forfeiture will allow the government to strip criminal orga-
nizations of their economic power. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191
(1983); H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., pt. 1, at 6 (1984). See also 116 Cong. Rec. 607
(1970) (remarks of Sen. Byrd); 116 CONG. REc. 35193 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff); S.
REP. No. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (forfeiture based on violations of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5324 and
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 & 1957). See also 31 U.S.C. §§ 5315 & 5316 (1988).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1988) (forfeiture based on violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 215,
656-657, 1005-1007, 1014, 1341, 1343, or 1344 affecting a financial institution). These
crimes were added to the forfeiture statute in 1989 as part of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§§ 961 & 963, 103 Stat. 183, 499-501, 504-05 (1989) (codified at scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
53. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, supra note 48, at 200-01 (1984 amendments' purpose
is to close a loophole whereby forfeiture could be avoided by sham transactions).
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988).
55. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (1988).
56. See 21 U.S.C. § 8 53(p); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
57. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988).
58. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989). These cases are intelligently discussed in Jacobs,
supra note 1. See also Notes cited supra note 1.
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assets, the government can seize the fees from the lawyer. Once the
government proves that property used to pay the lawyer is forfeitable
and was transferred to the lawyer after the date of the crime, the only
defense the lawyer has is the bona fide purchaser defense.59 The law-
yers must prove in a post-trial hearing that at the time they received
the fee, they were "reasonably without cause to believe" the property
was subject to forfeiture6 ° Lawyers defending RICO, drug felony,
money laundering, and financial institution fraud cases risk losing
their fees if they cannot meet this standard.
The Department of Justice has adopted internal guidelines which
limit situations where it will seek forfeiture of lawyers' fees.61 Assum-
ing the payment to the lawyer is not a sham transfer (that is, the fee is
a bona fide payment for services rendered on a criminal case) the gov-
ernment will only pursue forfeiture when it has reason to believe the
lawyer has actual knowledge that the asset is forfeitable.6 2 Thus,
under the guidelines, a lawyer who avoids actual knowledge even by
willful blindness will not be liable for forfeiture. 63 Further, the lawyer
must have the actual knowledge at the time the fee is earned,64 so if
59. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) & (n)(6) (1988). This conclusion is consistent with United
States v. A Parcel of Land, Buildings, Appurtenances and Improvements known as 92
Buena Vista Avenue, Rumson, N.J., 52 Crim. L. Rep. 2231 (1993). Buena Vista holds,
inter alia, that transferees can assert the innocent owner defense to protect interests in
property acquired after the illegal transaction giving rise to forfeiture. This conclusion is
consistent with the pattern we analyze for lawyers: in trying to qualify as bona fide pur-
chasers, the lawyer will have acquired her interest in the property after the date of the act
giving rise to forfeiture.
60. Id.
61. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-111.000 to 9-111.700,
reprinted in ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 1, at B-i [hereinafter DOJ FOR-
FEITURE GUIDELINES] ("Policy with Regard to Forfeitures of Assets Which Have Been
Transferred to Attorneys as Fees for Legal Services."). These guidelines were omitted
from the Manual in 1989, but the impact of this is unclear. The Department still adheres
to the guidelines. See ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 1, at B-1 n.*.
62. DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.430.
63. The Department of Justice guidelines do not explicitly reject willful blindness,
but its rejection is indicated by two factors. First, the knowledge that a criminal defense
attorney must have is always described in the guidelines as "actual" knowledge. The
only meaning this term can have is to eliminate imputed knowledge or willful blindness.
Second, the mental state required for attorneys doing civil work - "reasonable cause to
know" the asset was forfeitable - expresses a willful blindness-type standard and pro-
vides a contrast with the "actual knowledge" standard prescribed for attorneys doing
criminal work. See DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.420 to .430.
64. See id. at 9-111.501. This guideline states that:
a transfer occurs at the time an attorney becomes entitled to the asset free from
any claim by the defendant or others. For example, if an asset is transferred to
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the fee is earned and the lawyer finds out later the money was tainted
and forfeitable, the government will not seek forfeiture. Finally, the
knowledge that an asset is subject to forfeiture must relate to a specific
asset,65 and the Department's evidence of the lawyer's knowledge
must come from sources other than compelled disclosure of confiden-
tial communications from the client.
66
Like the Department of Justice guidelines on section 1957, these
forfeiture guidelines are solely for the Department's internal use.
They are not enforceable in any way, 67 and they govern only the De-
partment's decision to pursue forfeiture, not how the Department will
proceed once the decision is made.68 The government's self-imposed
limits are some protection for lawyers, but forfeiture is still a threat to
fees. And, of course, the threat is greater if the Department of Justice
disregards the voluntary limits.
These three laundering laws affect lawyers in several ways. If
lawyers deposit fees over $10,000 and the property is derived from
certain crimes, they may be criminally liable under section 1957 if
they knew what their client was doing. If lawyers are paid over
$10,000 in cash, they must report the transaction to the government
under section 60501. Intentional failure to report is a crime. And if
lawyers take tainted fees from defendants who get convicted of certain
crimes, the lawyers may forfeit their fees to the government.
The Justice Department's guidelines on the use of the laws
against lawyers69 reduce the risks for lawyers. Given the voluntary
an attorney to be held in trust for the defendant, with the understanding that
the attorney shall be entitled to a portion of the asset for legal services rendered,
the time of the transfer will be the time at which the attorney renders the serv-
ices and becomes entitled to the asset.
Id. For a non-refundable retainer, the fee is earned on transfer. But if the client is billed
hourly, the time of transfer is not necessarily the same as the time at which the fee is
earned. See infra text accompanying notes 114, 145-49.
65. DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.430.
66. Id. This exclusion of confidential communications is narrower than the DOJ
Guidelines applicable to section 1957. Those guidelines exclude confidential communica-
tions and the lawyer's investigative efforts. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.400 ("These guidelines
are set forth solely for the purpose of internal Department of Justice guidance. They are
not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal, nor do they
place any limitations on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of
Justice."). See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); supra note 36.
68. See supra note 38.
69. These guidelines are discussed supra in text accompanying notes 30-38 & 61-68.
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nature of those guidelines,70 however, the potential'impact of the laws
on lawyers remains a threat. The reality of the defense lawyers' world
includes the possibility that the Department might disregard its own
policies. For these lawyers, the possibility of the laws' full application
to their practice is a justifiable concern. In this article, therefore, the
impact of the laws will be analyzed under the assumption that the
Department will not adhere to its guidelines in order to consider the
full potential effect, of the laws on defense lawyers.71
Constitutionally, these laws can be applied to lawyers. The re-
maining question is whether they should be applied to lawyers.72 One
possible danger is that the laws cause lawyers to act unethically.
Whether they do is the question to which we now turn.
II. THE LAWS' ETHICAL IMPACT
Commentators have criticized the money laundering laws' effect
on lawyers, claiming that the laws raise ethical problems for defense
lawyers.73 Ethics questions are raised in six areas: competent repre-
70. The guidelines are viewed by the Department and by the courts as non-binding.
See supra notes 38 & 67. Moreover, they apply only to decision to prosecute, as described
supra in notes 38, 68.
71. We recognize that if the Department adheres to its guidelines, much of the po-
tential for harm to lawyers and their ethics will be reduced. See Brickey, Forfeiture,
supra note 1, at 536-38 (discussing Justice Department guidelines for forfeiture cases).
72. The joint dissent in United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), and Caplin
& Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989), noted that although the
Court's decision may have resolved the constitutional issue, the debate about the wisdom
of the application of the forfeiture law to lawyers should continue. Caplin & Drysdale,
491 U.S. at 656 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This Court has the power to declare the Act
constitutional, but it cannot thereby make it wise.").
73. See, e.g., DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 60; Albert J. Krieger & Susan
W. Van Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client and the New Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737,
741 (1985); Ephraim Margolin & Bradford Battson, Fee Forfeiture in Federal Criminal
Cases, TRIAL, Sept. 1987, at 27-28; Geoffrey A. Haddad, Note, Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States: Constitutionalizing Attorney Fee Forfeitures with Ethical Di-
lemmas for the Criminal Defense Bar, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 825, 826 (1990) (forfeiture
laws present "insoluble ethical dilemmas" and a "minefield of ethical traps" for criminal
defense lawyers); Richard W. Mass, Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Should Defend-
ants Be Allowed to Retain "Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the "Fruits of the Crime"?, 39
STAN. L. REV. 663, 671-74 (1987); Elizabeth A. Raies, Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees: A Trap for the Unwary, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 825, 844-45 (1986); Elizabeth E.
Stanulis, Comment, Criminal RICO. Forfeiture of Fees, Sixth Amendment Rights, and
Attorney Responsibilities, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 589, 601 (1987); United States v. Badala-
menti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("ethical problems of great magnitude").
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sentation, unreasonable fees, conflicts of interest and plea negotia-
tions, contingent fees, confidentiality, and the lawyer as witness.
A. Competent Representation
One ethical concern about the impact of the money laundering
laws is that the laws impede lawyers' duty to represent clients compe-
tently.74 Specifically, section 1957 is said to cause lawyers to avoid
the discovery of facts which would result in knowledge that the fee is
criminally derived, because that knowledge could lead to the lawyers'
own criminal liability under that provision.75 Similarly, some argue
that the criminal forfeiture laws cause lawyers to avoid facts that
would undermine a possible fee forfeiture defense for them.76 Thus, it
is maintained, the laws reward ignorance and, as a result, encourage
lawyers to provide inadequate investigation.
More specifically, that argument is based on the mens rea re-
quirement in section 1957 and the availability of a bona fide purchaser
defense to fee forfeiture. To violate section 1957 a lawyer must
"knowingly" engage in a monetary transaction in property that is
criminally derived.77 Arguably, a lawyer who avoids acquiring infor-
mation which would lead to that knowledge can avoid criminal liabil-
74. Margolin & Battson, supra note 73, at 27-28; Haddad, supra note 73, at 839;
Stanulis, supra note 73, at 601-02.
75. Brickey, Tainted Assets, supra note 1, at 49 (recounting argument); Wolfteich,
supra note 1, at 847-48 (recounting NACDL argument that § 1957 would cripple the
adversary system); Boylston, supra note 1, at 959.
76. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 649-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Margolin &
Battson, supra note 73, at 27-28; Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 863; Boylston, supra note 1,
at 954-55; Haddad, supra note 73, at 838-39; Mass, supra note 73, at 672-73; Stanulis,
supra note 73, at 601-02.
The amicus brief of the ABA in Caplin & Drysdale emphasized the law's incentive
for ignorance:
If counsel fees are indeed forfeited at trial, the sole statutory mechanism for
relief lies in a post-trial hearing at which defense counsel bears the burden of
proving his ignorance of the facts which support the forfeiture verdict ....
Whereas, before and during trial, counsel must investigate and master all rele-
vant evidence to defend his client, after trial, counsel must prove his ignorance
of both the facts leading to fee forfeiture and the government's forfeiture con-
tentions ....
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association at 17-18, Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (No. 87-1729).
Even the Justice Department's guidelines recognize the impact that fee forfeiture can
have on preventing the free flow of information between the lawyer and client. DOJ
FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.230.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1988), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 4-38.
1180
1992] Money Laundering & Lawyers 1181
ity. Similarly under the forfeiture law, those who can establish that
they were bona fide purchasers and were reasonably without cause to
believe that the property transferred to them was subject to forfeiture
can avoid that result.78 Lawyers trying to protect their fees might be
inclined to avoid the information that would give them reasonable
cause to believe their fee was involved in a forfeiture crime.
The law of legal ethics, of course, requires lawyers to provide
their clients with competent representation. 79 Such representation in-
cludes adequate investigation and thorough preparation,80 including
inquiry into all relevant facts known to the client.8' Section 1957 and
the forfeiture law appear to provide some legal advantage for the ig-
norant and, therefore, to dissuade lawyers from seeking certain
knowledge about their clients. The laws thus arguably generate a
conflict between the clients' interest in having fiflly informed lawyers
and the lawyers' interest in avoiding their own criminal liability and
in keeping their fees. It is feared that some lawyers may yield to these
disincentives and their own personal interests, fail to become ade-
quately informed about all matters bearing on the criminal represen-
78. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 46-68.
79. Rule 1. 1 of the Lawyers are obligated to provide "competent representation" to
a client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. The Model Rules are the ABA's most recent statement of the ethical
obligations of lawyers and have been adopted with varying modifications by 34 states and
the District of Columbia. State Ethics Rules, ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual, supra note
44, at 01:3-4 (July 15, 1992).
Under the ABA's 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer was
prohibited from representing a client in a legal matter unless competent to handle it,
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-101(A)(1) (1969) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE], and from handling a legal matter without adequate preparation. Id. DR
6-101(A)(2).
80. MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 and cmt. 5; MODEL CODE EC 6-4.
81. Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code provides unequivocal expression
of this aspect of competent representation, although thorough investigation is logically a
necessary component of it. Other standards of the American Bar Association, however,
state the obligation directly. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standards 4-3.2(a) (1979) ("As soon as practicable the lawyer should
seek to determine all relevant facts known to the accused."). See also id. Standard 4-4.1
("It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of
the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and
the penalty in the event of conviction.... The duty to investigate exists regardless of the
accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the ac-
cused's stated desire to plead guilty."). Furthermore, the Standards clearly declare that
lawyers should not be dissuaded from this duty by their own interests. Id. Standard 4-1.6
("considerations of personal and professional advantage should not influence the lawyer's
advice or performance.").
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tation, and thereby provide less than competent representation to
their clients. In particular, lawyers might avoid investigating their
clients' fee payments, but the laws could inhibit lawyers' broader in-
vestigations, too.
1. Questions About the Fee
The information most relevant to the lawyer's liability under sec-
tion 1957 and fee forfeiture is information concerning the legitimacy
of the source of the fee. Lawyers wary of those provisions could react
by avoiding inquiries about the source of the fee. Whether that avoid-
ance would diminish the competent representation of the client, how-
ever, is not clear. A lack of information on the legitimacy of the
source of the fee would only reduce the competence of the lawyer's
representation if it affects the substantive defense of the client. This is
not inevitably so, but to examine the laws' potential for reducing law-
yers' competence, we can assume that it does.82
The lawyer's questions about the legitimacy of the source of the
fee may be direct or indirect. Although the direct question is awk-
ward, many lawyers are asking it. As for indirect questions, far from
discouraging such questions, the laws actually encourage them.
a. The Direct Question About the Fee
Some argue that the laws will dissuade lawyers from asking their
clients directly about the legitimacy of the source of their fee.83 On
the contrary, anecdotal evidence shows that many lawyers are asking
this question.84 For lawyers who choose not to ask this direct ques-
tion, it is not an effort to avoid bad news. Rather, the reason is that
the question is awkward and rude.8 5 It is especially sensitive because
82. See, notes 49-52 supra, and accompanying text. Forfeiture is now widely avail-
able. Furthermore, we assume that the source of the fee is only an issue in cases where
the lawyer is consulted about crimes which allow forfeiture or other suspicious factors
arise.
See, factors listed in ABA RICO Practice Guide, supra, note 1 at 33 (size of payment
whether it is in cash, whether it is paid from an off-shore account, and whether client has
apparently legitimate source of income).
83. See RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS 178
(Supp. 1990).
84. See correspondence on file with Syracuse Law Review (letter from Kirk Monroe
and notes of telephone conversation with Gordon Greenberg).
85. It has been noted more broadly that lawyers tend to be generally reluctant to
discuss legal fees with clients. See, e.g., Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers,
Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 919, 953 (only 27 of 45
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it will be asked when the fee is first tendered, at a time when the
lawyer's relationship with the client is new and the lawyer is trying to
encourage trust and confidence.
Aside from it being rude, lawyers may eschew the direct question
because even when it is asked, more investigation is still required.
Lawyers who ask the explicit question about whether the fees were
criminally derived will have to explain to the client why they are ask-
ing such a question.8 6 The explanation will likely signal the client
that the right answer in terms of the client's interests is that it is clean.
Thus the client's response to the direct question may not be reliable.
In weighing the factors on whether there is reasonable cause to believe
the fee is dirty, the client's mere assertion that it is clean may not
alone be sufficient. Under the forfeiture laws, the lawyer carries the
burden of proving by a preponderance that he was "reasonably with-
out cause to believe" the fee was subject to forfeiture.8 7 It would be
risky for a lawyer to assume she could carry this burden merely by
proving that she asked the client if the fee was clean and the client
said it was. Thus, even if the lawyer does ask the direct question, she
will still need to investigate further to meet the statutory standard.
lawyers interviewed regularly discussed and obtained agreements regarding fees at initia-
tion of representation); Alan D. Hutchinson, Getting Paid, 34 RES GESTAE 24, 24 (1990)
("Even experienced lawyers would prefer to skirt the issue [of fee discussions]."); Robert
W. McMenamin, 10 Ways to Avoid Fee Trouble, in 2 LAW OFFICE ECONOMICS & MAN-
AGEMENT MANUAL § 24:04 (Paul S. Hoffman ed., 1986) ("Many complaints against law-
yers involve a lack of communication, much of it concerning fees."); JAMES W. MCRAE,
LEGAL FEES & REPRESENTATION AGREEMENTS 1 (1983) ("The single area of the prac-
tice with which most lawyers have the most difficulty is fees and billing."); KLINE D.
STRONG & ARBEN 0. CLARK, LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT 175 (1974) ("Preparing bills
to submit to clients for payment of legal services is probably the most onerous task which
must be performed in the practice of law. Distasteful as the task is, it is nevertheless
necessary."); DEBORAH HELLER & JAMES M. HUNT, PRACTICING LAW AND MANAG-
ING PEOPLE: How To BE SUCCESSFUL 137 (1988) ("Setting and discussing fees, billing
clients, and collecting fees are areas many attorneys would prefer that someone else man-
age.").
The awkwardness and reluctance that many lawyers feel about any discussion with
clients regarding fees may reflect the historical characterization of the practice of law as a
learned profession rather than a common business or trade. See HENRY S. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 169-70 n.5 (1953) (relating the tradition of the British bar, by which the
client paid his fee by inserting it in a purse hanging at the back of the lawyer's garb, still
reflected by the symbolic purse at the back of the modern barrister's gown).
86. The explanation from the lawyer would be that the lawyer is asking because if
the fee is dirty and the lawyer knows this at a certain time, the lawyer may lose the fee or
face criminal liability. The explanation will reveal, explicitly or implicitly, that the law-
yer is inquiring to be sure the fee is clean to protect himself or herself.
87. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
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The lawyer who does nothing to pursue the reasonableness of the cli-
ent's answer is taking a risk that she will not be able to establish bona
fide purchaser status. Likewise, for section 1957, reliance on the cli-
ent's mere assertion without further investigation would be unwise,
although probably not as dangerous as in the forfeiture context. 88
A direct question on the legitimacy of the fee is often asked.
When not asked, it is not because the answer may be dangerous under
the laundering laws but because the question is painful and the client's
assertion of cleanliness will be helpful but not conclusive in avoiding
the impact of the laws.8 9
b. Indirect Questions About the Fee
Direct questions on the legitimacy of the source of the fee are one
approach for defense lawyers. Questions about the client's age,
schooling, work history and family background will also give the law-
yer an indication whether the client could have accumulated sufficient
clean assets to pay the fee. 90
Anecdotal evidence suggests lawyers are asking these indirect
questions.91 If they are not, they should be. Such questions are one
way for lawyers to protect themselves from getting involved in a case
which results in forfeiture of fees or their own indictment.
Lawyers facing potential criminal liability under section 1957 or
88. It is easier for the government to impose the forfeiture sanction than section
1957 liability because the mens rea and burdens of proof differ. The mens rea of forfei-
ture is lower than that of section 1957 ("reasonably without cause to believe" for forfei-
ture as opposed to "knowingly" for section 1957) and the burden of proof for forfeiture is
on the lawyer (by a preponderance) rather than on the government (beyond a reasonable
doubt).
89. In an ABA monograph, the RICO Cases Committee recommends that lawyers
ask the direct question on the source of the fee. See ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE, supra
note 1, at 33. The Committee recommendation that lawyers ask the question will surely
increase the likelihood that lawyers will ask it, even though it remains awkward and
other investigation is required.
90. For example, a client who is 32 years old, with little education and no developed
business or career who can pay a large fee (with or without the assertion that it is clean) is
riskier than a middle aged person with a business or career.
91. See ABA Meeting Features Programs on Fee Forfeiture, Government Investigative
Tactics, 49 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1499-1501 (1991) [hereinafter ABA Meeting] (panel
discussion at 1991 ABA Annual meeting). As an alternative to quizzing clients, many
defense attorneys are now relying on prosecutors' representations that they will not pur-
sue the fees. See, correspondence and notes of telephone interviews on file with Syracuse
Law Review. This new approach is more evidence of the "informal professional culture"
between these specialized bars mentioned infra in n. 131.
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fee forfeiture should be more, rather than less, likely to inquire about
the facts surrounding their fee payments. Far from discouraging such
questions, the laundering laws actually operate to the contrary by pro-
viding incentives for lawyers to inquire about the source of the fee.
The laundering laws encourage the questions because the laws make
the lawyer's self-interest depend on the answer. It is therefore un-
likely that the federal laws actually cause lawyers to refrain from ask-
ing, directly or indirectly, any questions about the fee that they asked
previously before the laws were enacted.
2. Investigation Generally
Beyond the argument that the laws discourage lawyers from ask-
ing the client questions about the source of fees, some commentators
have alleged that the federal laws more broadly discourage lawyers
from investigating any facts suggesting their clients' guilt 92 in order to
avoid knowledge which would preclude a later good faith defense to
fee forfeiture93 or which would raise a section 1957 problem for the
lawyer.94 The laws are thus said to promote studied ignorance rather
than thorough inquiry. If this is true, the laws could be said to deter
the sort of careful investigation necessary for ethical, competent rep-
resentation of a client. But there are several reasons that forfeiture
and section 1957 do not encourage knowledgeable, conscientious law-
yers to rely on deliberate ignorance.
a. Manipulation of the Mens Rea
The argument that the laundering laws encourage ignorance is
premised on the assumption that lawyers will try to avoid the impact
of the laws by manipulating their mens rea. But manipulation of the
92. The laws are not likely to affect lawyer's direct questions to clients about their
guilt or innocence. Such information is rarely of interest to lawyers. This is because the
client's view is generally based on a misconception of those terms. A client's guilt is a
product of many factors, such as the client having engaged in the proscribed conduct, the
client having possessed the required state of mind, the absence of affirmative defenses,
and the ability of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. The client's opinion regarding his own guilt is simply irrelevant to the defense
lawyer. Section 1957 and the forfeiture law likely have no effect on this area of inquiry.
93. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 649-50 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). For citations noting this effect of the criminal forfeiture laws,
see supra note 76.
94. For citations to authorities noting this effect of section 1957, see supra note 75.
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mens rea by avoiding actual knowledge would not be enough to avoid
the sanctions of forfeiture and section 1957.
As to forfeiture, if the client is convicted on the forfeiture count
and the government pursues the fees, the only defense the lawyer has
is the bona fide purchaser defense. 95 To meet this, the lawyer must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the lawyer was a bona
fide purchaser and was "at the time of purchase reasonably without
cause to believe the asset was subject to forfeiture .... ,,96 The mens
rea standard, "reasonably without cause to believe," sounds like a
negligence standard. It relies on cause to believe rather than actual
belief, and the lack of cause to believe must be reasonable, again sug-
gesting the standards of negligence. Even if this language is construed
to state more than a negligence mens rea standard, it is clear that it
states less than a knowledge mens rea standard. 97
It will often be difficult for lawyers to meet this mens rea stan-
dard.98 If the assets are specifically described in the indictment and
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988) ("Any such property that is subsequently trans-
ferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of
forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the trans-
feree establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) ... that he is a bona fide pur-
chaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably without
cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture . . ... "). This assumes the
transfer of the fee to the lawyer is after the date of the crime. Buena Vista, supra note 59.
See also United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Congress defined...
two rather limited categories of third parties who are entitled to petition the courts for a
hearing to adjudicate the validity of their interests in the forfeited property .... Those
who fall outside [the] exceptions, regardless of how sympathetic they are, must petition
the Attorney General for relief.").
96. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) & (n)(6)(B) (1988).
97. The statute may articulate a recklessness standard. Recklessness is defined as
acting to "consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk .... The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's con-
duct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The distinction be-
tween recklessness and negligence is that "[r]ecklessness involves conscious risk creation;
negligence involves the failure to perceive a risk of which one ought to have been aware."
PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW 67 (4th ed. 1990).
As noted above, we are assuming the Department of Justice Guidelines on actual
knowledge are not used.
98. Cases indicate how difficult it would be for criminal lawyers to prove they were
reasonably without cause to believe the fee was forfeitable. See, e.g., United States v.
Long, 654 F.2d 911, 917 (3d Cir. 1981) (under circumstances of the case, two lawyers
experienced in criminal law could not qualify as being reasonably without cause to believe
the fee was forfeitable). For example, the client's indictment on charges authorizing for-
feiture puts the lawyer on notice that the fee is forfeitable, even where the indictment does
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the lawyer receives the described property as a fee, the lawyer will
clearly have cause to believe the fee is subject to forfeiture.99 Where
the indictment does not specifically describe assets or the client has
not yet been indicted, however, the lawyer may be able to prove that
he was reasonably without cause to believe that the fee payment was
subject to forfeiture. 10 But it would be naive for the lawyer to as-
sume she could meet this standard by deliberately avoiding investiga-
tion. If no suspicious circumstances are present, 10 , the lawyer is truly
not identify the property specifically but merely tracks the statutory language. See
United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court and the
Department of Justice agree that lawyers will generally not qualify as being "reasonably
without cause to believe" that property is subject to forfeiture. See United States v. Mon-
santo, 491 U.S. 600, 604 n.3 ("highly doubtful" that one who defends a client in a crimi-
nal case that results in forfeiture could prove that he was without cause to believe the
property was forfeitable); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617,
632 n. 10 (1989); DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.230 ("the De-
partment recognizes that attorneys, who among all third parties uniquely may be aware
of the possibility of forfeiture, may not be able to [fall within the exception] . . .");
Brickey, Forfeitures, supra note 1, at 503 ("[T]he nature of a criminal defense lawyer's
representation may preclude him from using the BFP provisions to shelter his fees from
forfeiture."); DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 68-70; Margolin & Battson, supra
note 73, at 27 ("Defense practitioners are particularly vulnerable to the forfeiture statute
because of the difficulty in proving that, at the time they earned the fees, they were 'rea-
sonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.' "); Thomas
D. Morgan, An Introduction to the Debate Over Fee Forfeitures, 36 EMORY L.J. 755, 758-
59 (1987) ("In practical effect, no lawyer could take a fee from a defendant charged with
a crime under RICO or CCE without such notice. Indeed, notice would be given by the
charge itself.").
99. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 632 n.10 ("[T]he only way a lawyer could be
a beneficiary of... [the bona fide purchaser exception] ... would be to fail to read the
indictment of his client."). In Caplin & Drysdale, the petitioner conceded that a criminal
defense lawyer would be unable to qualify as a bona fide purchaser if the indictment
specified the forfeitable assets. Id. See also DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note
61, at 9-111.511 (if property is specifically described, lawyer has actual knowledge); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2); William W. Taylor III, Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963: RICO's
Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379, 393 (1980); Note, supra note 73, at
838.
In some cases further notice to the lawyer is provided by a restraining order, issued
exparte by the district court at the time of the indictment, prohibiting the defendant from
transferring any of the enumerated assets. Such orders are authorized by 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(e)(1) (1988). Under certain extreme circumstances, a restraining order may be is-
sued even prior to indictment. See id.
100. But see Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476 (the client's indictment on charges authoriz-
ing forfeiture puts the lawyer on notice that the fee is forfeitable, even where the indict-
ment does not identify the property specifically but merely tracks the statutory language).
101. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) & (7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Indeed,
willful blindness would also establish a mens rea of knowledge. See id. § 2.02(7); Jewell,
532 F.2d at 697.
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ignorant, and this kind of ignorance is surely protected. In contrast,
ignorance which is deliberate or willful because suspicious circum-
stances arose and the lawyer looked the other way is not protected.
When a lawyer becomes suspicious and then deliberately avoids ques-
tions that would enlighten, that conduct is willful blindness.10 2 Under
traditional mens rea principles, willful blindness is more than enough
to establish recklessness or negligence.10 3
Lawyers differ in the amount of risk they are willing to tolerate
in regard to fees, but if any suspicious factors arise, it is unlikely that
many would see intentional ignorance as a refuge from forfeiture. Be-
cause the mens rea standard is not safely avoided by deliberate lack
of knowledge, forfeiture law does not encourage intentional
ignorance. 104
Under section 1957, the mens rea the government must prove is
that the lawyer had knowledge the fee was criminally derived.10 5 As
with forfeiture, the lawyer could not avoid this mens rea merely by
deliberately blinding himself to information. Such avoidance of infor-
mation is classic willful blindness, 10 6 which will establish the mens rea
of knowledge. 10 7 The lawyer relying on deliberately preserved igno-
102. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 951 (1976) ("To the requirement of actual knowledge there is one strictly limited
exception .... [T]he rule is that if a party has his suspicion aroused but then deliberately
omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed
to have knowledge.") (quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL
PART, § 57 (2d ed. 1961)).
103. See, e.g., ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note I, at 33 (listing factors
such as the size of the payment, whether it is in cash, whether it is paid from an off-shore
account, and whether the client has apparently legitimate sources of income).
104. Of course, it may be that lawyers misinterpret the mens rea standards and
think they can avoid sanctions through deliberate blindness. If the law's harmful impact
is a result of lawyers' misunderstanding, this is not evidence - it is a bad law.
The Justice Department's guidelines pertaining to forfeiture add an additional rea-
son why lawyers generally need not reduce their investigation in order to protect their
status as bona fide purchasers. Those guidelines provide that the department will pursue
forfeiture only when "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the attorney had actual
knowledge that the asset was subject to forfeiture at the time of the transfer." DOJ FOR-
FEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.430. Furthermore, that knowledge must
be based on facts and information other than compelled disclosures of confidential com-
munications made during the course of the representation. Id. Additionally, the lawyer
must have actual knowledge that the particular asset received as a fee was subject to
forfeiture. Id. at 9-111.510.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1988). See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
106. See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 697.
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7). See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 697.
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rance would not be in as much danger under the "knowingly" stan-
dard of section 1957 as she would be under the "reasonably-without-
cause-to-believe" standard of forfeiture,108 but it is still not a safe situ-
ation. Thus like forfeiture, section 1957 does not discourage investi-
gation because as lawyers must know, willful blindness may itself be
construed as knowledge and the mens rea requirement would be met.
b. Manipulation of Other Elements
Even if it were possible to manipulate the mens rea to avoid the
sanctions of forfeiture and section 1957, it will often be unnecessary
because other elements can be manipulated more readily. In the case
of forfeiture, lawyers' cause to believe the fee was criminally derived is
only relevant at "the time of purchase" of the lawyers' services. 0 9 If
lawyers are paid a fee and only later develop cause to believe it was
dirty, they are not subject to forfeiture. Thus the lawyer can reduce
the risk of forfeiture by moving up "the time of purchase."u 0
Anecdotal evidence shows lawyers are doing this. Some lawyers
have opted for non-refundable "global" or lump sum fees payable
early in the representation.II Such fee agreements define the time of
purchase of the lawyer's services as the initial payment, 112 rendering
subsequent suspicions irrelevant. The entire fee is thereby protected.
There are several problems with this approach. The first is the
108. See supra notes 93-100.
109. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
110. Criminal defense lawyers typically utilize advance payments of fees. See MAR-
TIN MAYER, THE LAWYERS 161 (1966) ("criminal practice is the one branch of the law
where lawyers collect their fees in advance."); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WIL-
LIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK OF THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 84 (1985); UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 83, at 175
n.2 (Supp. 1991); Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498, 514-15 (1991); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Con-
cept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702, 734 (1977).
Ill. See ABA Meeting, supra note 91, at 1499 (comments of Charles Blau). In one
extreme case, a Florida lawyer had clients pay him $10,000 per person, as a form of pre-
paid legal fee, before they engaged in drug-smuggling operations. If any of the persons
involved were arrested during the operation, the lawyer would represent them without
additional charge. The lawyer was convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana and to
defraud the Internal Revenue Service. Martha Brannigan, Lawyer is Convicted In Case
Involving "Prepaid" Program, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1989, at 5.
112. For further discussion of nonrefundable retainers, see infra text accompanying
notes 141-42.
1992] 1189
Syracuse Law Review
awkwardness of demanding a presumably large,113 non-refundable 114
fee from the client early in the representation, before the client and
lawyer have an established relationship. Such a demand may scare
away clients or at least impair their trust. If the client is not driven
off, it is often hard for the client to come up with the funds for such a
fee all at once. Finally, the use of large, non-refundable lump sum
fees may turn out to be unreasonable and therefore unethical." 5 To
the extent a lawyer can define the "time of purchase" as early in the
representation, though, it relieves any pressure to manipulate the
mens rea by maintaining ignorance.
Similar arguments have been made that section 1957 will dis-
courage adequate investigation.16 This argument assumes that once
lawyers suspect that the fee is criminally derived, they will continue
with the case and try to avoid liability by preserving their technical
ignorance. But the elements of section 1957, analyzed carefully, indi-
cate that there are other ways lawyers can avoid liability without de-
liberately minimizing their knowledge of the case by limiting their
investigation.
As described above, the conduct element of section 1957 is en-
gaging in a monetary transaction in property worth over $10,000
which is derived from specified unlawful activity." 7 Additionally, the
lawyer must engage in this conduct with the prescribed mens rea, that
is, knowing that the property is criminally derived." 8 Few lawyers
will satisfy these elements.
First, if the client has already been indicted, the lawyer may sail
into a statutory safe harbor based on the Sixth Amendment." 9 The
definition of "monetary transaction" excludes all transactions neces-
sary to preserve the right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. 20 Thus, an attorney depositing fees from a client after
113. The fee would need to be sufficiently large to cover the possibility of having to
do a lot of work.
114. The fee would have to be non-refundable to make it clear that title passes at the
time of transfer rather than as the work is done.
115. For further discussion of ethical treatment of nonrefundable retainers, see infra
text accompanying notes 148-51.
116. See supra note 76-77.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (1988), discussed supra in notes 21-28 and accompany-
ing text.
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indictment is not liable because the monetary transaction element is
missing.
Even without this harbor, the timing of the monetary transaction
is important. To face liability, the lawyer must have the mens rea at
the time of the conduct.121 For section 1957, that means the lawyer
must know that the fee is criminally derived when it is deposited in
the firm account or otherwise negotiated. 122 For criminal defense
lawyers who often demand full payment before beginning work, 123 the
likelihood is slight that they will investigate enough to learn that the
fee is criminally derived before engaging in a monetary transaction
with that fee.124
The timing element can also operate to protect a lawyer who
does know that the fee is criminally derived. If the lawyer learns that
the fee is criminally derived before engaging in a monetary transac-
tion with it, the lawyer can hold the fee, delaying the monetary trans-
action until the client is indicted and the possible safe harbor opens. 125
Of course, if the client is never indicted, the lawyer never gets into
that harbor. Yet if the client is never indicted, the likelihood that the
lawyer will be prosecuted under section 1957 based on fees from that
client is also reduced. Because it will be difficult for the government
to prove that the fee was derived from specified unlawful activity by
the client.
The section 1957 net, therefore, catches only those lawyers who
are working for clients not under indictment and who receive fees
over $10,000 which the lawyers know are criminally derived at the
121. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoT-r, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 268 (2d
ed. 1986) ("[I]t is a basic premise of Anglo-American criminal law that the physical
conduct and the state of mind must concur .... The easiest cases are those in which the
bad state of mind follows the physical conduct, for here it is obvious that the subsequent
mental state is in no sense legally related to the prior acts ... of the defendant." (foot-
notes omitted)).
122. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 17, at 9-105.400 ("The relevant time for deter-
mining whether the requisite knowledge exists is the time at which the individual engages
in a transaction within the ambit of Section 1957.").
This assumes deposit in a firm account qualifies as a monetary transaction. Such a
deposit would meet the definition in section 1957(f)(1), quoted supra note 11. The fact
that final title to the fee may not pass until the lawyer withdraws against the account is
irrelevant in defining whether a monetary transaction has occurred.
123. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
124. It is possible that the client will describe the fee as criminally derived as it is
handed to the lawyer, but this seems unlikely.
125. Of course, a lawyer who holds the fee for a time would have to take it in a
guaranteed form so there was no risk it would be dishonored later.
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time they deposit them. Because of the nature of criminal practice
(some clients only consult a lawyer after indictment, and lawyers
often receive full payment before beginning work), this congruence of
conditions is rare. Because the threat of criminal liability under sec-
tion 1957 is slight, the need for lawyers to limit the extent of their
knowledge to avoid that liability is commensurately slight.
To the extent the conditions do coalesce, of course, the lawyer is
vulnerable. Many believe that the rare lawyers who satisfy these con-
ditions, i.e., those who knowingly take dirty money, already practice
in such questionable ways 126 that their protests that section 1957
causes them to act unethically by deterring zealous investigation are
empty.
Although it is possible for a criminal defense lawyer to fall within
the elements of section 1957, it will occur infrequently because of the
narrowness of the crime and the usual realities of criminal practice.
Furthermore, if the lawyer concludes that criminal liability is a risk,
some elements can be manipulated to avoid liability, like the date of
the monetary transaction. With these options available, it is unlikely
that lawyers would choose to avoid liability by limiting their knowl-
edge to negate the mens rea element. Defeating the conduct elements
is easier and is also more effective than defeating the mens rea element
because fact-finders can infer what the defendant knew, 127 but dates
are intractable. In short, lawyers would be foolish to try to avoid
liability by limiting their knowledge.
c. Other Pressures Encouraging Investigation
For those criminal defense lawyers who are disposed to try to
qualify under the bona fide purchaser exception or avoid section 1957
by limiting their knowledge, other pressures operate to restrain
126. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY
221, 250 (1986) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REPORT]. See generally Wolfteich, supra note
1, at 864. These lawyers engage in a range of unsavory conduct, including subornation of
pejury, obstruction of justice, and other practices which facilitate crime. See PRESI-
DENT'S REPORT, supra, at 257-58. See generally Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 864. They
are the targets Congress aimed at with section 1957. Id. ("During consideration of
House Bill 5077 [an early version of section 1957], the Subcommittee on Crime expressed
the most concern about lawyers involved in a 'growing persistent crime,' often involving
longstanding relationships with drug dealers." (footnotes omitted)).
127. These inferences are easy to draw under the willful blindness doctrine which
basically lets the fact-finder resolve whether the defendant should have investigated
further.
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them. 128 As noted above, the law of legal ethics forbids inadequate
investigation. 129 In opting for ignorance, criminal defense lawyers
would have to be willing to risk ethical complaints and disciplinary
proceedings for failing to represent a client competently. Lawyers'
fear of civil liability also dissuades them from acting contrary to their
clients' interests in this way.130
Moreover, the restraints operating to prevent lawyers from inad-
equate investigation go beyond the legal restrictions. Lawyers' sense
of loyalty and dedication to the clients who seek their assistance typi-
cally transcends the letter of the law of legal ethics and legal malprac-
tice. These feelings of professional and personal obligation cause
lawyers to work to see their clients' interests furthered rather than
sacrificed. Lawyers' professional pride prevents them from aban-
doning their duty to investigate their clients' matters thoroughly. In-
deed, criminal defense lawyers, who often deal with the same
prosecutors, would be particularly unwilling to embarrass themselves
and develop a reputation for doing bad work.131
Lawyers' personal pride also operates to restrain lawyers from
abandoning their clients' interests for their own gain. Lawyers gener-
ally fear the consequences of their own ignorance, whether intentional
or inadvertent. They do not want to go to trial with only selected
knowledge and risk public revelation of their ignorance. Finally, law-
128. Indeed, lawyers might be expected to investigate more thoroughly under cer-
tain circumstances, such as when there is reason to believe that a fee payment is being
made from stolen property or that a client is using the lawyer's services in the furtherance
of a crime. Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 868. Courts sometimes expect more of a lawyer
when facts suggest that a client is involving her in criminal conduct. See, e.g., United
States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) (lawyer convicted of securities crimes
and mail fraud despite lack of actual knowledge of client's criminal activities).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
130. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, 206-07 (1986) (the in-
creased threat of malpractice liability causes lawyers to conform to the profession's stan-
dards for the protection of client interests). See John M. Burkoff, Legal Negligence: The
Threat and the Reality in Criminal Cases, TRIAL, Sept. 1987, at 33. According to Profes-
sor Burkoff, among the most frequent claims in malpractice actions brought against crim-
inal defense lawyers are inadequate preparation or investigation, bad advice regarding the
entry of guilty pleas, and conflicts of interest. Id. at 37. These are the same sorts of
misconduct that the forfeiture laws are said to encourage. Even though malpractice ac-
tions against criminal defense lawyers are rarely successful, id., most of these lawyers
presumably would want to avoid such conduct out of concern about the mere filing of
such suits against them.
131. Some lawyers have recognized the "informal professional culture" existing
among prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers, suggesting that it is a check upon
prosecutorial power. Constitutional Law Conference, 58 U.S.L.W. 2200, 2207 (1989).
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yers hate to lose. Their desire to win encourages thorough investiga-
tion, and if the lawyer wins, of course, there is no fee forfeiture and
the risk of section 1957 liability is reduced. 132
The forfeiture law and section 1957, therefore, provide no incen-
tive for defense lawyers to avoid questioning clients or otherwise in-
vestigating the facts of the case. Because of the laws, many lawyers
are asking clients directly if the fee is criminally derived. To the ex-
tent this question goes unasked it is not out of fear of the answer, but
rather because the question is awkward and the answer standing alone
is insufficient to protect the lawyer. Indirect questions on possible
legitimate sources of income are also helpful and are in fact being
asked. Forfeiture and section 1957 laws do not deter these questions,
but actually provide incentives for lawyers to ask them. Additionally,
investigation is not deterred because deliberately avoiding knowledge
would amount to willful blindness, and a mens rea of willful blindness
is sufficient for liability under both forfeiture and section 1957. Any-
way, manipulating the mens rea by maintaining technical ignorance is
unnecessary because other elements of forfeiture and section 1957 are
more readily avoided. Finally, for lawyers tempted to try to avoid the
laws by maintaining ignorance, there are other sources of counter-
vailing pressure, including the law of legal ethics and malpractice and
professional and personal pride. In the face of this array of incentives,
the money laundering laws should not cause reduced investigation.
B. Unreasonable Fees
As noted above, the money laundering laws provide incentives
for defense lawyers to change their fee arrangements with clients.133
While these changes make legal and economic sense, they raise ques-
tions about the ethics of the fees. 134
The money laundering laws have three likely effects on fees.
First, they pressure lawyers to charge higher fees to compensate for
the additional risk and complication presented by the money launder-
ing laws. The risk stems from the possibility of fee forfeiture and the
132. The risk of section 1957 liability is reduced because the government will have a
harder time proving that the fee was in fact derived from specified unlawful activity if the
client is acquitted. One commentator has noted this tendency of litigators as a check on
conflicts of interest. Lushing, supra note 110, at 524.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 109-15.
134. This ethical problem apparently has not been recognized by any of the critics of
the money laundering laws.
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specter of the lawyer's own criminal liability under section 1957. The
complication arises out of the lawyer's attention to new concerns
about the source of fee payment, the legality of the fee, the possibility
of the lawyer's own testimony, the likelihood of additional proceed-
ings to obtain the fee, and the need for reporting to the government
under section 60501. For defense lawyers the laws have made fees
more speculative, their own prosecution more likely, and work more
difficult. The cases are thus economically less attractive. One predict-
able response is to charge higher fees.
Second, the money laundering laws pressure defense lawyers to
get full payment at the very outset of the representation.13 5 This pres-
sure results both from forfeiture and section 1957. As noted above,
lawyers may avoid forfeiture by proving that they were reasonably
without cause to believe at the time of the purchase of the legal serv-
ices that the fee was subject to forfeiture. By moving the time of
purchase of the legal services to the earliest point in the representa-
tion, lawyers can obtain title to the assets before any reason to ques-
tion the legitimacy of the fee arises.' 3 6 Thus, lawyers maximize
protection of their fees from forfeiture by demanding fee payment at
the beginning of the representation. Similarly, early payment and de-
posit of fees may be used by lawyers to avoid criminal liability under
section 1957. Such an approach would permit lawyers to engage in
the monetary transaction with the fee prior to obtaining knowledge
that the assets used to pay the fee were derived from specified unlaw-
ful activity. 137 In these ways the laws provide incentives to defense
lawyers to demand fee payment at the earliest point in their relation-
ships with clients.
The third effect of the money laundering laws on fees is the in-
creased pressure they generate on defense lawyers to use nonrefund-
able retainers. 3 8 Both forfeiture and section 1957 encourage early fee
payment to protect lawyers, but early payment alone will not suffice.
135. This pressure is described supra in text accompanying notes 110-12.
136. See supra text accompanying note 110.
137. Id. This conclusion assumes that such large up-front payments would be seen
as bona fide fees under the statute rather than sham transactions.
138. This tendency is described supra in text accompanying notes 110-15. The dis-
tinction between a nonrefundable retainer and a fee advance is discussed in WOLFRAM,
supra note 130, at 505-06; ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual, supra note 44 at 41:602 (July 18,
1990). See ABA Meeting, supra note 91, at 1499 ("Some [lawyers] require the client to
agree that the fee is earned at the time it is paid, no matter what happens later.") (quoting
Charles Blau).
1992] 1195
Syracuse Law Review
If a defense lawyer accepts early payment of a fee merely as an ad-
vance against which withdrawals will be made as work proceeds, title
to the fee has not passed to the lawyer until that work is performed. 139
In the forfeiture context, the lawyer's increasing knowledge as work
progresses reduces the chance of successfully claiming bona fide pur-
chaser status for the entire fee. Similarly, such fee advances leave
open the possibility that the withdrawals from the lawyer's trust ac-
count and subsequent deposits in the operating account of the lawyer
would be monetary transactions made with the requisite knowledge
for liability under section 1957. To avoid such results, lawyers will be
inclined not only to demand early payment but also to characterize
that payment as nonrefundable, regardless of later developments.
The law of legal ethics demands that fees be reasonable."4 The
increased risk and complication presented by cases involving the
money laundering laws would undoubtedly justify a larger fee than if
such laws were not implicated.' 4' Thus, the mere fact that the laws
cause defense lawyers to charge higher fees is not an ethical problem,
assuming that the fees remain within the bounds of reason. Similarly,
the fact that defense lawyers would move the payment of the fee to an
early point in the representation does not suggest any ethical prob-
lem.142 The financial aspect of the lawyer-client relationship is appro-
priately resolved early in a representation, 43 and there is no ethical
reason why it could not be done immediately upon a client's consulta-
139. Such advance payments would remain the client's funds until services were
provided and the lawyer asserted the right to withdraw the funds as hers. WOLFRAM,
supra note 130, at 506. This is accomplished through use of a trust account. For the
ethical controls on the use of such an account, see MODEL RULES Rule 1.15; MODEL
CODE DR 9-102.
140. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.5(a). The Model Code provides that legal fees shall not
be "clearly excessive." MODEL CODE DR 2-106(A). The Code provision goes on, how-
ever, to define a fee to be clearly excessive "when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in
excess of a reasonable fee." Id. DR 2-106(B). Thus, even the Model Code's ethical limit
on fees turns on a reasonableness test.
141. One of the factors used for the determination of the propriety of a fee under the
Model Rules and the Code is "the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly."
MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(a)(1); MODEL CODE DR 2-106(B)(1).
142. The ethical rules contain no provisions on when payment may be appropriately
demanded.
143. Both the Model Rules and the Code encourage lawyers to conclude the matter
of fees as early as possible in the relationship. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(b) & cmt. 1;
MODEL CODE EC 2-19.
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tion with a lawyer. 144
The use of nonrefundable retainers, however, can raise ethical
concerns. Most states recognize that lawyers are free to make such
fee arrangements, assuming they are clearly understood by the cli-
ents.145 When events subsequent to the fee payment render the fee
paid excessive,1 46 however, some states have recognized that a portion
of the fee must nevertheless be refunded to the client despite its char-
acterization as nonrefundable.147 A lawyer approached by a client
fearing indictment for certain crimes might be inclined to demand the
payment of a large nonrefundable retainer at the outset of the repre-
sentation in an effort to avoid fee forfeiture and possible criminal lia-
bility under section 1957. Should the client not be indicted, however,
the lawyer may be ethically compelled to return to the client the ex-
cess beyond what would be a reasonable fee for services actually
provided. 148
Although the money laundering laws provide defense lawyers
with incentives to adjust their fee practices, they present no novel or
particularly difficult ethical problem relative to fees. As in all repre-
sentations, defense lawyers merely need to be alert to the reasonable-
ness of their fees, not only at the inception of the representation, but
also as the representation continues and is concluded.
C. Conflicts of Interest and Plea Negotiations
Another question is whether the forfeiture law creates a conflict
144. Practically it might be difficult for lawyers to demand immediate payment of a
fee, given the personal dynamics of an initial consultation with a potential client. This
practical effect is discussed further in part III.
145. See WOLFRAM, supra note 130 at 178-79. For a brief summary of the case law
and ethical opinions to this effect, see ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual, supra note 44 at
41:602-03.
146. For example, when a plea negotiation obviates the need for trial, an assumption
of which was included in the fee determination at the outset of the representation. See
ABA Meeting, supra note 91 at 1499 (when lawyer requires client to agree that fee is
earned at time it is paid, no matter what happens later, it may be overreaching from
ethical standpoint) (quoting Charles Blau).
147. See, eg., Jennings v. Backmeyer, 569 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (lawyer
must return unearned portion of fee when client dies prior to completion of work); Jacob-
son v. Sassower, 122 Misc. 2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1983), afid, 107 A.D.2d 603 (1st Dep't 1985)
aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 991 (1985) (lawyer must return unearned portion of so-called
nonrefundable retainer when client discharges lawyer).
148. Professor Wolfram has opined, although in another context (when lawyers are
discharged by their clients), that "no retainer should be nonrefundable to the extent that
it exceeds a reasonable fee." WOLFRAM, supra note 130 at 547.
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of interest for lawyers in plea negotiations.1 49 The possibility of fee
forfeiture, it is said, pressures defense lawyers to protect their own
interests in the fee during plea negotiations. 150 That pressure may
cause lawyers to urge their clients to plead guilty to offenses not in-
volving forfeiture 51 or to plead guilty to more serious offenses if the
prosecutors waive forfeiture,1 52 even though the bargain may not
serve the best interests of the client. 153 The forfeiture law thus pro-
motes "fee bargaining" for lawyers rather than plea bargaining for
clients. 154
It is likely that the forfeiture law has this effect. From the law-
yer's perspective, fee forfeiture is a particularly harsh personal conse-
quence of a client's conviction. The prospect of forfeiture
undoubtedly shades a lawyer's view of a proffered plea bargain. It is
149. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 650 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brickey, Forfei-
ture, supra note 1, at 534; DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 80; Krieger & Van
Dusen, supra note 73, at 741 ("a conflict of classic and monumental proportions" leaving
lawyers in "an untenable position"); Danton A. Berube, Note, Drug Proceeds Forfeiture
and the Right to Counsel of Choice, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1377, 1395 (1990); Wolfteich,
supra note 1, at 853-54; Haddad, supra note 73, at 840-42; Mass, supra note 73, at 673;
Note, supra note 73, at 844-45; ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 1, at 14.
150. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 650 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); DuMouchel &
Oberg, supra note 1, at 80; Margolin & Battson, supra note 73, at 28; Mass, supra note 73,
at 673; Note, supra note 73, at 844-45. One defense lawyer has stated, "Lawyers who
agree to plead their clients guilty, who don't antagonize prosecutors, are more likely to
retain their fees .... Hey, whose interest is the lawyer going to look out for in such a
circumstance?" Neil A. Lewis, Drug Lawyers' Quandary: Lure of Money vs. Ethics, N.Y.
TIMES Feb. 9, 1990, at A1, B11.
151. Brickey, Forfeiture, supra note 1, at 534; Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 73,
at 741; Haddad, supra note 73, at 841. See also William J. Genego, Risky Business: The
Hazards of Being a Criminal Defense Lawyer, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1986, at 2, 7 (three
defense lawyers reported such a government offer).
152. Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 73, at 741; Mass, supra note 73, at 673.
153. Alternatively, the prospect of forfeiture might cause a defense lawyer to urge a
client to go to trial, in hopes of avoiding forfeiture through an acquittal, when the client's
best interests would suggest a guilty plea even though it would also result in fee forfeiture.
DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 80; Haddad, supra note 73, at 840. That plea
agreements involve bargaining in regard to the forfeiture of assets as well as the entry of
guilty pleas is shown by Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 617. There the defendant entered
a plea agreement which included his entry of a guilty plea to a Continuing Criminal
Enterprise charge as well as his agreement to forfeit all the assets specified in the indict-
ment. Id. at 621.
154. It is difficult to trace the origin of the play on words, "fee bargain." Professor
Yale Kamisar used the term in a summary of the Supreme Court's term and Monsanto
and Caplin & Drysdale decisions. See Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 136, at
2207.
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undeniable that forfeiture law thus creates a conflict between the de-
fense lawyer's own interests and those of the client.
The conflict, however, is a common one for lawyers. Every legal
fee creates a conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client. 155
Lawyers representing clients under contingent fee agreements in civil
cases are pressured to settle their cases quickly, even if short of their
value, to maximize the hourly return on their time. 5 6 Hourly billing
promotes delay and time-sheet padding 157 and in criminal and civil
cases tempts defense lawyers to reject settlement and go to trial.
Lump sum fee payments, frequently used by criminal defense lawyers,
pressure lawyers to accept negotiated outcomes without thorough in-
vestigation and without trial. 58 Every day lawyers confront the in-
herent conflict that arises because clients want to minimize the
amount they pay for legal fees while lawyers want to maximize it.
The resolution of that conflict is provided clearly in the law of legal
ethics. The lawyer must subordinate self-interest to the interests of
the client. 159
155. That is, the lawyer's interest is to maximize the fee while that of the client is to
minimize it. See generally Earl Johnson, Jr., Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of
Litigation Investment Decisions, 15 LAW & Soc'Y Rav. 567 (1980-81).
156. A quick settlement for a certain amount may appear to the lawyer to be prefer-
able to the uncertainty of a jury verdict after lengthy and costly preparation. The earlier
the settlement offer is made, the more attractive it may be in terms of the costs already
invested in the representation. Cf Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Impact of Fee Arrange-
ment on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW & Soc'y REv. 251 (1985).
157. See generally Johnson, supra note 155. The practice of padding time sheets has
been less charitably described in Lisa G. Lerman, When Lawyers Are Liars, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 30, 1990, at 13.
158. In this sense the lump sum payment frequently employed by defense lawyers
can operate to create pressures similar to those engendered by contingent fees in civil
cases. For discussion of the use of contingent fees in criminal cases, see infra text accom-
panying notes 170-82.
159. Under Model Rule 1.1, a lawyer must represent a client competently. Further-
more, under Model Rule 1.7(b), if a lawyer's own interests will adversely affect the repre-
sentation, the lawyer's representation of the client is prohibited. Thus, a lawyer who is
unable to subordinate self-interest in a fee to the interests of the client must withdraw
because of the inevitable violation of these two rules. MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(a)(1).
The same result is dictated by the prior Model Code. DR 7-101(A)(3) prohibited a law-
yer from prejudicing the client during a representation, and DR 5-101(A) prohibited a
lawyer from continuing a representation when the lawyer's professional judgment would
be affected by the lawyer's financial interests, unless the client consented after consulta-
tion. Under DR 2-110(B)(2), the lawyer was required to withdraw if the representation
would result in the violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
In a different context, the Supreme Court denied that the anti-client pressures cre-
ated by the lawyer's self-interest in fees presented an "ethical dilemma" for the lawyer.
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While the forfeiture law creates an additional source of such con-
flicts for criminal defense lawyers, they are not different in kind than
other fee conflicts. The same anti-client pressures created by legal
fees are inevitable in private practice. Nor are the economic pressures
created by the forfeiture law more intense than other fee conflicts. 160
The forfeiture law does not create any ethical problems for lawyers
engaged in plea negotiations that are novel in their nature or extent.
What restrains lawyers presented with these conflicts in their fee
arrangements from acting out of sheer avarice and yielding to their
own self interest in maximizing their fees? One restraint is the law of
In Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), the Court faced the issue of civil rights plaintiffs
who had accepted a settlement offer in an amount greater than they expected to receive at
trial but conditioned on their waiver of their statutory right to receive attorneys' fees.
The Supreme Court held that the statute did not prohibit such waivers as parts of settle-
ments. JeffD., 475 U.S. at 729. In doing so, the Court also rejected counsel's argument
that such waivers presented an ethical dilemma for the lawyers. The Court saw the law-
yer's only ethical obligation as being the duty to represent the clients competently and
zealously, despite any self-interest in obtaining fee payment. Id. at 728.
Similarly in the forfeiture context, a lawyer's ethical obligation is to provide compe-
tent and zealous representation for the criminal defendant despite the threat of fee forfei-
ture. We do not deny that the threat of forfeiture creates real anti-client pressures. The
point is that the pressures are not unlike those felt in any private representation of a client
regardless of the fee arrangement utilized. The professional obligation of lawyers is clear;
the self-interest in fees must be subordinated to the best interests of the client.
The possibility of fee forfeiture and the professional obligation to disregard the desire
to be paid, of course, may cause lawyers to be disinclined to accept cases with a possibility
of forfeiture. This practical effect is discussed in part III of this article. Our point here is
that the ethical issue presented is common and clearly resolved. The client's interests
come first.
160. A defense lawyer might face the loss of an entire fee through forfeiture but only
when there are no non-forfeitable assets owned by the client. See Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered, v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 625 (1989). Even in this worst case situation,
a lawyer who is denied a fee as a result of forfeiture would likely be entitled to retroactive
payment under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988). See Joseph
diGenova & Constance L. Belfiore, An Overview of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984 - The Prosecutor's Perspective, 22 AM. CRIM. L. Rnv. 707, 717 (1985). This
theory was used to compensate defense lawyer F. Lee Bailey, who paid the government
$145,000 he had received in fees for representing a convicted drug dealer. See Prominent
Lawyer Says He'll Return Fee, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 1990, at 3. Similar settlements have
been reached in other forfeiture cases using CJA rates to determine the amount defense
lawyers are entitled to keep. Rosiland Rossi, U.S. Takes Half of $40,000 Drug King Paid
to Lawyers, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at 16. Although that payment will likely be
less than the client would have paid, it would surely ameliorate the loss suffered by the
lawyer. Under the CIA, lawyers are compensated at a rate not to exceed $60 per hour for
time in court and a rate not to exceed $40 per hour for time out of court. The maximum
amount a lawyer can be paid for representing a client charged with a felony is $3500; the
maximum amount for a misdemeanor is $1000. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(l)-(3) (1988).
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legal ethics.161 Lawyers are reluctant to risk ethical complaints and
discipline by trading their clients' interests for more money. The law
applicable to fiduciaries, which imposes a duty of good faith and fair
dealing upon lawyers, is a further legal impediment to self-dealing.
1 62
Lawyers' fear of malpractice claims also dissuades them from subor-
dinating their clients' interests to their own urge for larger fees.
163
In addition, as noted above,164 lawyers' conduct is governed by
more than the dictates of the law. Their sense of personal and profes-
sional loyalty and dedication to their clients operates as a further
check on lawyers' human tendency toward greed in profiting at their
clients' expense. Also, lawyers' professional and personal pride deters
them from freely shortchanging their clients for a larger fee.
Lawyers choosing to maximize their own interests at the expense
of their clients by agreeing to an unfavorable plea bargain are violat-
ing ethical rules, risking civil liability, betraying those who trust them,
and undermining their own professional reputation. There may be
some criminal defense lawyers who would endure these risks in order
to secure payment of their fee in a given case. Surely most would
not.165 The forfeiture law imposes pressure upon defense lawyers, but
it is likely that most will resist that pressure and represent their clients
competently.166 Those lawyers undoubtedly would prefer that the
161. Lawyers are expected to provide competent and diligent representation so as
not to prejudice their clients' rights. MODEL RULES Rules 1.1 & 1.3. See MODEL CODE
DR 7-101(A). Furthermore, lawyers are prohibited from allowing their personal inter-
ests, including those involving their fees, to interfere with the provision of this representa-
tion. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b); MODEL CODE DR 5-101(A). The ABA STANDARDS
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE are equally clear. Defense Function
Standard 4-1.6 declares the client's interests to be paramount in all aspects of the lawyer's
representation, including plea negotiations. Standard 4-3.5(a) requires the defense lawyer
to disclose to the client all conflicts of interest. Standard 4-5.1(a) requires the lawyer to
advise the accused with complete candor, and Standard 4-5.2(a) leaves the decision
whether to accept a plea bargain up to the client.
162. The lawyer's fiduciary duty is discussed generally in WOLFRAM, supra note 130
at 145-48.
163. Lawyer malpractice actions can extend to intentional wrongs by lawyers
against the interests of their clients. Id. at 227. For discussion of malpractice actions
against criminal defense lawyers, see supra text accompanying note 130.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
165. Some commentators evidence a less favorable view of lawyers' ethics, appar-
ently assuming the worst of those in the profession. See Krieger & Van Dusen, supra
note 73, at 740 (the potential of forfeiture "creates a threat to the lawyer because the
lawyer will seek to protect the fee."). See also, Lewis, supra note 150.
166. The fee pressures may, however, cause lawyers to avoid criminal cases involv-
ing forfeiture. This practical effect of the law is discussed in part III of this article.
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forfeiture law did not exist, but the law does not put lawyers in any
new or more intense conflict with their clients over fees.
D. Fee Forfeiture and Contingent Fees
The argument has also been made that the forfeiture law creates
a contingent fee when applied to defense lawyers' fees.1 67 Assuming
the forfeiture elements are met, the only way for the defense lawyer to
keep the fee is to avoid the substantive conviction. 168 Practically, in
that situation the fee is contingent upon the defendant's success in the
criminal case. 169
Contingent fees in criminal cases are proscribed by every codifi-
cation of legal ethics in this country. 170 The reasons for this proscrip-
tion, however, are not clear.17 1 In its Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, the American Bar Association justified the restriction
167. ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 1, at 13-14; DuMouchel & Oberg,
supra note 1, at 80; William J. Genego, The Legal and Practical Implications of Forfeiture
ofAttorneys'Fees, 36 EMORY L.J. 837, 841 (1987); Margolin & Battson, supra note 73, at
27, 30 n.8; Berube, supra note 149, at 1394; Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 854; Boylston,
supra note 1, at 954-55; Haddad, supra note 73, at 836-38; Mass, supra note 73, at 673;
Note, supra note 73, at 844; Stanulis, supra note 73, at 601-02.
The argument was embraced by the Caplin & Drysdale dissent, 491 U.S. at 649, but
rejected cursorily by the majority, id. at 632 n. 10. The majority doubted whether the fact
that collection of the fee turned on acquittal rendered the fee inappropriate because "this
often may be the case in criminal defense work." Id. Presumably the Court had in mind
that criminal defense lawyers would regularly have difficulty collecting fees from con-
victed clients, a situation similar to that presented by forfeiture. The contention, how-
ever, overlooks the reality of criminal practice in which payment of fees in advance is the
standard agreement. For further discussion of this aspect of private criminal practice, see
supra note 110.
The amicus brief of the American Bar Association stressed that the contingent fee
aspect of forfeiture raised "serious ethical concerns." Brief Amicus Curiae of the Ameri-
can Bar Association at 17-22, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S.
617 (1989)(No. 87-1729).
168. The lawyer can avoid forfeiture by defeating either the substantive count or the
forfeiture count.
169. To be accurate, the client's ability to pay the fee may be contingent on success
rather than an obligation to pay it. ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 1, at 13-
14.
170. See WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 536. Both the Model Rules and its predeces-
sor, the Model Code, prohibit contingent fees in criminal cases. MODEL RULES Rule
1.5(d)(2); MODEL CODE DR 2-106(C).
171. WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 536 ("The criminal defense prohibition seems to
be largely an historical accident."). Professor Wolfram discusses the history and criti-
ques the rationale of the prohibition on contingent fees in criminal cases. Id. at 535-38.
Professor Lushing provides an excellent discussion of the rationales for the prohibition.
See Lushing, supra note 110, at 513-36.
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by noting that criminal cases, unlike some civil cases, do not generate
a res out of which a contingent fee could be paid. 172 Not all civil cases
in which contingent fees are used generate such a res,1 73 though, and
it is unclear in any event why a res should make a difference. 174 Some
have justified the restriction because of fears that criminal defense
lawyers might be driven by contingent fees to bribe jurors or suborn
perjury.I75 Similar concerns suggest that a prohibition should extend
to civil cases, but it does not. It has also been observed that criminal
defense lawyers might be deterred from negotiating for guilty pleas to
lesser offenses if their fee is contingent upon acquittal.17 6 Again, the
same fee pressures operate in civil cases where contingent fees are rou-
tinely used despite their potential for affecting settlement decisions by
the lawyer. 177 The argument has also been made that contingent fees
in civil cases are necessary to provide representation to the indigent
while in criminal cases the Sixth Amendment mandates appointed
172. MODEL CODE EC 2-20. It might be noted, however, that it is not unusual for a
criminal case to be focused on a particular sum of money or other asset. For example, if a
defendant is charged with bank robbery, the money in the possession of the defendant
upon arrest is surely a primary subject of the prosecution. If this defendant is acquitted,
the lawyer could be paid from that money. If the defendant has no other assets, the
lawyer's fee would likely not be paid. The situation is identical to the indigent plaintiff in
a civil case, and there is as much a res against which a fee could be charged in this
criminal case as in the civil litigation.
173. For example, when a contingent fee is used for the representation of a defend-
ant in a civil matter. WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 532-33 & 536.
174. The fundamental characteristic of the contingent fee is that the lawyer assumes
the risk that he will receive a reduced or no fee because of an unfavorable result. There is
no logical reason why a lawyer and client should not be able to agree on a contingent
fixed fee, say $10,000, in the event that the client prevails in certain litigation or obtains a
specified result in negotiations even though no money or other property passes to the
client as a result. In this situation, the fee is contingent, but there is no res.
175. WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 535-36; See Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture ofAttor-
neys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional
Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 775 (1989) (contingent fees in
criminal cases, "by making the defense attorney an interested party in the case, provide
the potential for corrupting justice.").
176. WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 538. This pressure would only be felt when the
fee was contingent upon acquittal. A fee in a criminal case could as easily be contingent
upon a reduction in the charge or reflect the degree of reduction obtained on a sliding
scale. Id. In such cases, the contingency would not pressure a lawyer to go to trial in
hope of acquittal, although the fee might still create conflicts between the interests of the
client and the interests of the lawyer regarding the most favorable disposition. For fur-
ther discussion of this effect of fees on plea negotiations, see supra text accompanying
notes 149-66.
177. For further discussion of the effect of fees on negotiations in civil cases, see
supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
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counsel for poor defendants, thus obviating the need for contingent
fees.17 8 That argument has some merit but does not explain the broad
approval of contingent fees in civil cases regardless of the plaintiff's
wealth. 179 Others have noted more practically, and perhaps more
candidly, that the prohibition of contingent fees serves as a restriction
on fee competition and thus protects the established criminal defense
bar's standard practice of requiring clients to pay their fees up
front. 180
Regardless of the justification for the ethical rule against contin-
gent fees in criminal cases generally, the contingent aspect of the law-
yer's fee in forfeiture cases presents fewer concerns. For one thing,
when the client has some legitimate assets the fee can be paid from
them and forfeiture creates no contingency."8 The mere possibility of
forfeiture of certain assets, therefore, does not necessarily render the
fee contingent, if the client can pay with other assets.
8 2
Second, those worried about the absence of a res in criminal cases
may take some comfort from the fact that there is a res at issue in
forfeiture counts. The assets listed in the forfeiture count are the sub-
ject of the forfeiture proceedings in the case. Any claim to these as-
sets made by the lawyer is the subject of a separate hearing after
conviction.18 3 Whatever may be the function of a res to the legitimacy
178. ABA RICO PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 1, at 14.
179. The ethical rules do not limit the use of contingent fees in civil cases to impecu-
nious plaintiffs. MODEL RULES Rules 1.5(c) & 1.8(j)(2); MODEL CODE DR 5-
103(A)(2). The comments to MODEL RULES Rule 1.5 urge lawyers to use contingent fees
only when "consistent with the client's best interest." MODEL RULES Rule 1.5 cmt 3.
There are times, of course, when a contingent fee would not be advantageous for a client
who could afford an hourly fee. More directly, the Ethical Considerations of the Code
encourage lawyers not to use contingent fees for clients able to afford hourly fees, unless
the client so requests after being advised about the various fee possibilities. MODEL
CODE EC 2-20.
180. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 110, at 84; Morgan, supra note 110, at 734.
181. When the client has sufficient non-forfeitable assets to pay the fee, forfeiture
determines only the assets from which the fee is paid, not whether the fee is paid. Thus,
there is no contingency in these situations. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court noted in
Caplin & Drysdale, even a convicted client might obtain clean assets after conviction and
pay the criminal defense lawyer with those assets. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617, 625 (1989). Practically, of course, this does not seem likely
to be a common occurrence.
182. Furthermore, it is possible that the defense lawyer who loses her fee to forfei-
ture after her client's conviction can apply and qualify for retroactive appointment and
payment under the CJA. See supra note 160. The availability of such payment reduces
the "contingent" aspect of the fee subject to forfeiture.
183. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) (1988).
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of a contingent fee, therefore, is satisfied in the circumstances of crim-
inal forfeiture.18 4
Third, to the extent that the purpose of the contingency fee pro-
hibition in criminal cases is to discourage corruption of the criminal
justice system by lawyers greedy for their fees, the forfeiture law con-
stitutes a congressional statement that the societal goals of that law
are more important than congressional fears of such misconduct.8 5
The congressional objective of separating the criminal from the eco-
nomic value of the crime prevailed in Congress over any concerns
about perjury or bribery, conduct which is already prohibited by
other criminal laws.186
Fourth, while the contingency of the fee in forfeiture cases does
present some anti-client pressures in plea negotiations, these are just
like other fee pressures felt in similar situations by lawyers. As noted
above in regard to plea negotiations generally, lawyers facing forfei-
ture might be inclined to sell their clients short to secure payment of
their fees.' 87 To do so, however, they will need to disregard their legal
duties to their clients188 and discard their professional and personal
pride.'8 9 The contingency aspect of the fee makes such misconduct
no more likely than the general conflict of interest that exists between
lawyers and clients because of fees.
Finally, for established criminal defense lawyers concerned about
protecting themselves from the competition of other lawyers using
contingent fees in criminal cases, the contingent aspect of fees in for-
feiture cases presents little cause for alarm. That contingency is
184. The application of the forfeiture law to defense lawyers' fees puts their fees in
issue in the litigation. To that extent there is a res in such criminal cases even though in
many criminal cases generally, where there is no money or other property as the focus of
the case, there is none. For discussion of a non-forfeiture criminal case in which the
defendant's claim to part of the assets is at issue, see supra note 172.
185. The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 has been viewed as a deliberate
congressional balancing of law enforcement needs and constitutional concerns. Terry
Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising the
Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 747, 747 (1985). In the legislative history there is no
express weighing of congressional concern about subornation of perjury, bribery, or ob-
struction of justice with the seriousness of the offenses regulated by the act. Nevertheless,
the enactment of the forfeiture law implicitly indicates a greater concern about the of-
fender's use of criminally derived funds than about the likelihood of defense lawyers'
abuse of the judicial system in response to the contingency aspect of forfeitable fees.
186. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 & 1622 (1988).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32, 164.
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imposed by law, not by the choice of the defense lawyers facing forfei-
ture, and its use is in the hands of the prosecutors. Federal prosecu-
tors' use of criminal forfeiture to reach fees of defense lawyers in a
limited range of cases is little competitive threat to the common prac-
tice of up-front fee payments. Even if the promulgation of an ethical
rule to protect a segment of lawyers from fee competition is viewed as
legitimate, therefore, there is little reason to be concerned about the
contingency aspect of criminal forfeiture cases disrupting the general
sanctity of up-front fee payment.
None of the reasons given for prohibiting contingent fees in crim-
inal cases applies to the lawyer's fee in a forfeiture case. The alarm
expressed about this effect of the federal forfeiture law, therefore,
lacks substance. While the contingent aspect of such a fee suggests
the presence of an ethical concern, closer analysis dispels it.190
E. Confidentiality
Commentators have also asserted that the money laundering
laws impose on lawyers' ethical duty to preserve client confidential-
ity.191 This argument is usually directed at the section 60501 report-
ing requirement, 192 but similar comments have also been made about
fee forfeiture. 193
1. Section 60501
As described above,194 section 60501 requires lawyers to report
cash payments over $10,000 to the Internal Revenue Service, along
with the name and address of the payor and, if made by a benefactor,
the name of the beneficiary of the payment.195 The law thus compels
190. To have standard, and otherwise appropriate, fee arrangements between law-
yers and their clients rendered unethical because of a prosecutor's decision to seek forfei-
ture of the fee in a specific case would be a ludicrous application of the current rules on
contingent fees in criminal cases. Surely if the present ethical rules were held to warrant
discipline for such a lawyer, the rules would need to be changed.
191. Bennett L. Gershman, Legal Ethics: IRS Form 8300, CRIM. JUST., Spring
1990, at 22, 23; Boylston, supra note 1, at 955-56; Haddad, supra note 73, at 842-43;
Note, supra note 73, at 841-44; Stanulis, supra note 73, at 603-05.
192. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 191, at 23.
193. See, e.g., Brickey, Forfeiture, supra note 1, at 535.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
195. See infra app. 1 (Form 8300). For further discussion, see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
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lawyers to reveal to the government the names of certain clients and
information about the payment of their legal fees.
Lawyers are justifiably concerned about disclosing any client in-
formation to the government. 196 For one thing, lawyers must be cau-
tious about preserving the client's attorney-client privilege under
evidence law.197 Under certain circumstances that privilege covers in-
formation required by section 60501.198 Additionally, lawyers have a
196. Although the reporting requirement of § 60501 is part of the Internal Revenue
Code, the government wants the information for more than revenue collection purposes.
Section 60501 closes a loophole in the reporting laws. In enacting the other reporting
laws, Congress identified the purposes of the reporting laws as "to require certain reports
or records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory
investigations or proceedings." 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1988). These purposes are served as
well by § 60501. The information sought by Form 8300 is relevant to criminal investiga-
tions. The names of clients and other payors, large amounts of legal fees paid in cash,
and particularly the portion of a fee paid in $100 bills all provide promising leads to
investigators of drug and organized crimes. Furthermore, such disclosures will flag for
law enforcement those cash payments which might reasonably be viewed as involving the
proceeds of crime for purposes of section 1957 investigations. Additionally, certain infor-
mation on Form 8300 is useful to Immigration and Naturalization Service investigations
of illegal aliens.
197. For general discussions of the evidentiary privilege, see JOHN W. STRONG, MC-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 87-88 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; WOLFRAM,
supra note 130, at 242-43.
It is typically said that the identity of the client and the fact of consultation are not
privileged. MCCORMICK, supra, § 90; WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 259-60. The same is
true for details of the fee or other aspects of the employment agreement. Id.
The general rule, however, has been the subject of much dispute, especially where
the disclosure of client identity or fee information would be particularly harmful to the
client. MCCORMICK, supra, § 90. The resulting case law is inconsistent and confusing.
Steven Goode, Identity, Fees, and The Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
307, 311, 320-35 (1991). Professor Goode's recent article applying the privilege to the
disclosures required by section 60501 is enlightening. See id. at 346-56.
198. There are usually said to be three exceptions to the general rule that client
identity and fee arrangements are not privileged: the "legal advice" exception, the "last
link" exception, and the "communication rationale" exception. Note, Attorney-Client
Privilege, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1501, 1519-21 (1985). The legal advice exception covers
situations in which disclosing the identity of the client or the fee arrangement would be
equivalent to revealing an otherwise privileged communication. Max Stern & David
Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Re-
form, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1798 (1988). This disclosure would in essence implicate the
client in the matter for which the client sought legal advice in the first place. "In order
for [this] exception to apply, the person seeking the legal advice must be the client of the
[involved lawyer]." United States v. Anderson, 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990).
The second exception is the "last link" exception under which the information is
privileged if it provides the "last link" in a chain of incriminating evidence which could
eventually lead to the indictment of a client. This exception has not received the judicial
approval accorded the other two exceptions. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d
1992] 1207
Syracuse Law Review
broader duty to protect client confidentiality under ethics law. 199
The disclosures required by section 60501 fall within the ambit of
Model Rule 1.6(a), which protects "information relating to the repre-
sentation of a cient."20° Under that rule, such information is to be
kept confidential unless the client consents to disclosure or revelation
is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. 20 1
Further exceptions permit disclosure when necessary to prevent a cli-
ent's violent crimes 20 2 or when raised in support of the lawyer's own
1026 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 899 F.2d 1039 (1 th Cir. 1990); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 896 F.2d 1267 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Note, Attorney-
Client Privilege, supra, at 1520. See generally Tabackman and Elizabeth D. Smith, "Last
Link" Doctrine, 2 MONEY LAUNDERING LAW REPORT No. 11, June 1992 at 1.
The third exception is the "communication rationale" exception. It protects the in-
formation if disclosure would reveal otherwise privileged confidential communications.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990). The courts generally
define "communications" narrowly to include only deliberate communications, and this
exception is applied most often to situations where the court already has substantial infor-
mation, and disclosure of an anonymous client's identity would connect him with a sepa-
rately privileged communication. Note, Attorney-Client Privilege, supra, at 1521.
A recent decision by the Second Circuit upheld the reporting requirements of section
60501 against claims of violation of attorney-client privilege. In United States v. Gold-
berger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 504-05 (2d Cir. 1991), the court held that the infor-
mation sought by Form 8300 was not privileged. This was the first federal appellate
decision to rule on the application of the privilege to the reporting requirement.
For further discussion of the section 60501 reporting requirement and the lawyer-
client privilege, see Daniel J. Capra, Deterring the Formation of the Attorney-Client Rela-
tionship: Disclosure of Client Identity, Payment of Fees, and Communications by Fiducia-
ries, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 235 (1990). The focus of this article, however, is the
ethical duty of confidentiality rather than the reach of the attorney-client privilege under
the law of evidence. The former is considerably broader than the latter. See WOLFRAM,
supra note 130, at 296.
199. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6; MODEL CODE DR 4-101. We have used the term
"confidentiality" to describe the broad ethical duty pertaining to information about the
client and the representation. This is the approach of the leading treatise on legal ethics.
See WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 296.
200. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a). The ABA's prior Model Code protected client
"confidences" (information covered by the attorney-client privilege) and "secrets" (infor-
mation "gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held invi-
olate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be
detrimental to the client."). MODEL CODE DR 4-101(A). Even if not privileged, see
supra note 198, the information sought by section 60501 would typically fall within the
Code's definition of "secret" since it would be at least embarrassing, if not detrimental, to
the client to reveal it.
201. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a).
202. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(1). The Model Code contains a similar but broader exception
permitting lawyers to reveal a client's intention to commit any crime, not just those
which are violent, and the information necessary to prevent it. MODEL CODE DR 4-
101(C)(3).
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claims or defenses in actions arising out of the representation. 20 3
These exceptions do not cover the section 60501 information. Assum-
ing that the client has not consented,204 therefore, the duty to report
under section 60501 conflicts with the lawyer's duty of confidentiality
under Model Rule 1.6.
The ABA's comments to Model Rule 1.6,205 however, note two
further exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.20 6 For one, they rec-
ognize an exception when lawyers are compelled by other law to dis-
close confidential information.207 Thus, under the ABA's Model
Rules as explicated by the comments, a lawyer's disclosure of confi-
dential information under a law like section 60501 is viewed as appro-
priate rather than unethical.208
203. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(2). Similarly, the Model Code permits revelations
necessary for the lawyer to collect a fee or to defend against accusations of wrongful
conduct. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(4).
204. Client consent, if informed, justifies revelation under both the Model Rules and
the prior Model Code. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a); MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(1).
205. The drafters of the Model Rules envisioned the comments as not adding to the
obligations imposed by the rules but providing "guidance for practicing in compliance
with the Rules." MODEL RULES Scope cmt. 1.
206. Some states have made these exceptions part of the express rule on confidential-
ity. See, eg., KY. Sup. CT. RULES § 3.130(l.6)(b)(3); MICH. RULES PROF. CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(c)(2). 1.6(2).
207. This comment merely recognizes that the courts would, in some instances, find
the duty of confidentiality imposed by the rules to be subordinate to other law external to
the rules. Resolution of the issue of whether that other law supersedes the general protec-
tion of client confidentiality is expressly avoided by the drafters of the comment, although
they propose a presumption against such supersession. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt 20.
Surely there is no doubt about the superiority of federal law over state law. Section
60501 is a federal law, and federal law prevails over conflicting state law under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court
has recognized the supremacy of federal statutory law over state law of legal ethics in a
related context. In response to arguments that federal fee forfeiture laws conflicted with
state ethics rules prohibiting contingent fees in criminal cases, the Court stated that
"[t]he fact that a federal statutory scheme authorizing contingency fees - again, if that is
what Congress has created in § 853 (a premise we doubt) - is at odds with model disci-
plinary rules or state disciplinary codes hardly renders the federal statute invalid." Cap-
lin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 633 n.10. A federal district
court reached the same conclusion in holding that a state's ethics rule restricting the
power of prosecutors to obtain subpoenas against lawyers was inapplicable to federal
prosecutors. Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 764 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
208. UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 83, at 87 (Supp. 1988). The same result
is even clearer in those states that have made the "compelled by other law" exception a
part of the confidentiality rule itself. See supra note 206.
This result is a specific application of the general rule in legal ethics that other law
"trumps" the ethical obligation of loyalty to the client. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & SUSAN
KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 47 (1990).
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As another exception, the ABA's comments to Model Rule 1.6
state that lawyers are free to disclose information relating to the rep-
resentation of a client when directed by court order to do so.2°9 Since
the method of enforcing the section 60501 reporting obligation is to
subpoena lawyers who have failed to disclose the specified informa-
tion,210 a court order in a summons enforcement proceeding ends the
ethical problem abruptly. At that point, the lawyer is free under the
law of ethics to reveal the information.211
A lawyer's ethical duty when faced with a reporting obligation
under section 60501 is thus primarily one of procedure. The lawyer
should assert the confidentiality of the information about the client
and fee payment in the required report. If the government insists
upon receiving the information, however, the ethical duty of confiden-
tiality ends. A number of state bar associations have so concluded in
ethics opinions on section 60501.212
The "dilemma" generated by section 60501 is not an ethical one
209. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt 19.
210. The Internal Revenue Service summons authority is found at I.R.C. § 7602
(1988).
211. The same can be said to be true under the law of evidence and the attorney
client privilege. After invoking the privilege, the lawyer's duty to provide the informa-
tion is determined by the court. If the court orders the information revealed, the lawyer
is free to do so. WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 254.
212. See, e.g., Op. RI-54, reported at [Ethics Ops. 1986-1990] ABA/BNA Lawyer's
Manual, supra note 44 at 901:4772 (Aug. 1, 1990) (Mich. informal op.); Op. 86-2, re-
ported at [Ethics Ops. 1986-1990]; ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual, supra note 44 at
901:3201 (May 11, 1988) (Ill. informal op.); Op. E-90-3, reported at [Ethics Ops. 1986-
1990]; ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual, supra note 44 at 901:9111 (Apr. 2, 1990) (Wis. infor-
mal op.); Op. 41 (Revised), reported at [Ethics Ops. 1980-1985]; ABA/BNA Lawyer's
Manual, supra note 44 at 801:2703 (Nov. 15, 1985) (Ga. informal op.); Op. 214, reported
at [Ethics Ops. 1980-1985]; ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual, supra note 44 at 801:2307 (Mar.
22, 1983) (D.C. informal op.). Several of these ethics opinions are summarized in
Podgor, supra note 1, and Cornelia Honchar Tuite, Wrestling With 8300 Forms, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1990, at 114, 114-15.
Even an ethics opinion issued by the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL), an organization critical of the application of the money laundering
laws to lawyers, agrees with this conclusion. An opinion issued by NACDL concludes
that disclosure of the Form 8300 information "should not be made unless and until a
court, preferably an appellate court, considers the validity of the summons and any judi-
cial enforcement orders in this area and that court's ruling requires such disclosure."
Ethics Advisory Committee of NACDL, Formal Op. 89-1, at 14 (copy on file with the
authors). The opinion thus recognizes that the lawyer's ethical duty to maintain the
confidentiality of the information ends with the court's order of disclosure. This opinion
is summarized at ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual, supra note 44 at 6 Current Reports No.
10, at 183 (June 20, 1990).
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at all since the law of ethics permits the disclosure. The report re-
quired by section 60501 and the actions dictated by the law of ethics
undoubtedly make the representation of certain clients more compli-
cated and more burdensome for the lawyer. Also the disclosures
mandated by section 60501 may involve information that the lawyer
and the client would prefer not be revealed to the government.213 But
additional burden and disadvantage to the client do not an ethical
dilemma make.214 The law does not require the lawyer to choose be-
213. As one commentator has noted, if the client has already been charged with a
crime, the report mandated by § 60501 provides no new information to the government.
If the client has not yet been charged, however, the report does reveal that the client is
seeking advice from a criminal defense lawyer. This information might be helpful to the
government and detrimental to the client. Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 73, at 744
("The notice to the government of the newly created relationship with the criminal law-
yer alerts the government that a person, not yet targeted in its investigation, has real
concerns; or that an investigation that was peripheral to a person's interests should be re-
evaluated under these new circumstances.... [T]he interest of the government likely will
be piqued by the consultation with the criminal lawyer."). Others have stated that
§ 60501 "is the only statute in the world that requires a lawyer to give information that
can incriminate a client. It's like a self-generating red flag." Fred Strasser, Lawyers Must
Name Names, NAT'L L.J., June 24, 1991, at 18 (comment of Michael L. Bender, Chair,
ABA Criminal Justice Section).
214. Lawyers are sometimes compelled to reveal information that is harmful to their
clients. At least one court and some bar ethics opinions have required lawyers to reveal
that their clients have jumped bail. United States v. Del Carpio-Cortina, 733 F. Supp. 95
(S.D. Fla. 1990). There the court held that a lawyer with a firm factual basis for a belief
that a client has jumped bail must notify the court. Id. Another example of mandatory
disclosures contrary to the interests of the client is client perjury. MODEL RULES Rule
3.3(a)(4) & (b). See also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). Similarly, lawyers have
been typically viewed as having an obligation to reveal and to provide to the prosecution
any fruits and instrumentalities of a crime left in their possession by clients. See, e.g., In
re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), af'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). For
discussion of the line of cases so concluding, see WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 645-46. A
number of state ethics opinions have found similarly. Arizona Bar Op. 85-4, reported at
[Ethics Ops. 1980-1985] ABA/BNA Layer's Manual, supra note 44, at 801:1324 (Mar. 14,
1985) (lawyer who obtains incriminating evidence from his client's girlfriend must dis-
close the evidence to the prosecution even though evidence constitutes a "secret" under
Code); Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics, Op. 90-24 (Mar. 23, 1990),
discussed at [6 Current Reports] ABA/BNA Layer's Manual, supra note 44, at 130 (May
9, 1990) (lawyer possessing cash known to be stolen by client must return it to the proper
authorities, although he need not do so with the client's bag which held the cash).
Even the Model Rules contain obligations to reveal harmful information about a
client, whether or not such disclosure would reveal conidential information. MODEL
RULES Rule 3.3(a)(2), 3.3(b) (lawyer must disclose material fact if necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by client, even if disclosure involves confidential
information); id. Rule 3.3(a)(4), 3.3(b) & cmt 11. (lawyer who has offered evidence which
is false must take remedial measures whether or not such action would disclose confiden-
tial information).
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tween the unsavory alternatives of illegal or unethical conduct.215
The law merely compels the lawyer to take actions to protect, so far
as possible, the confidentiality of information about the client. While
lawyers would understandably prefer not to have to comply with sec-
tion 60501, objections to it on ethical grounds are strained.
The present ethical rules' lenient treatment of disclosures when
required by law or court order reflects the profession's assumption
that such requirements will typically show appropriate concern for
the lawyer-client relationship. In the case of section 60501, that as-
sumption is justified. It compels disclosure only of information tradi-
tionally viewed as outside the protection of the attorney-client
privilege, facts which have legitimate revenue collection relevance.
Furthermore, section 60501 seeks disclosure of all large cash transac-
tions and is not specifically targeted at lawyers. It is possible, how-
ever, to imagine broader legislative efforts to intrude on the lawyer-
client relationship through creative reporting requirements that reach
beyond the identity of clients and information pertaining to the pay-
ment of fees. The ethical rules, which now condone any disclosure
required by law or court order, would offer little comfort to the law-
yer or client in such circumstances. Any legislative efforts along these
lines, therefore, might necessitate a re-thinking of the current ethical
rules permitting disclosure. The reporting requirement of section
60501, though, does not warrant that concern.
2. Forfeiture
Confidentiality arguments relating to fee forfeiture require simi-
lar analysis. It is true that forfeiture calls into question facts regard-
ing fee payments216 and makes relevant the lawyer's testimony on
those payments. 217 When such testimony is sought, therefore, the
215. Of course, the whole problem of reporting under section 60501 can be avoided
by the lawyer's refusal to accept fee payment in cash or at least counseling the client as to
the problems presented by a cash payment. See United States v. Goldberger & Dubin,
P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
216. For discussion of the elements of forfeiture, see supra text accompanying notes
47-57.
217. The Justice Department, however, has voluntarily restricted its use of com-
pelled disclosures to establish forfeiture. In its guidelines, the Department declares that
"compelled disclosures of confidential communications made during the course of the
representation" will not be used to establish reasonable grounds to believe that the lawyer
knew assets were forfeitable at the time of the transfer or to show that the lawyer knew
that the assets came from criminal misconduct. DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra
note 61, at 9-111.430. See id. at 9-111.512 & 9-111.610.
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lawyer must be concerned about the evidentiary attorney-client privi-
lege and the ethical duty of confidentiality. As in the case of the sec-
tion 60501 reporting requirement, however, the lawyer's primary
concern is the procedural one of raising both privilege and confidenti-
ality for the court's consideration. Upon being ordered by the court
to answer, ethics law permits the lawyer to do so. 218
In the case of forfeiture there is a further justification for the
lawyer's disclosure of fee information. As noted above,219 the Model
Rule prohibition on the disclosure of client confidences makes an ex-
ception when the lawyer's conduct is called into question. Model
Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosures "to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved. ' 220 Arguably the government's claim to as-
sets held by the lawyer could be viewed as a "civil claim" under this
provision. As to the lawyer, the court's order of forfeiture has the
same effect as a civil judgment in that it requires the lawyer to dis-
gorge money.2
21
Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) further permits disclosures needed "to re-
spond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's repre-
sentation of the client. ' 222 Surely the forfeitability of a legal fee is
within the reach of this clause.223 Thus, testimony sought from a law-
yer in the forfeiture context falls within both portions of Model Rule
1.6(b)(2)'s exception to the ethical protection of confidentiality. Dis-
closure of fee information in such situations presents no ethical
difficulty.
Critics of the federal money laundering laws' impact on confiden-
tiality overstate the case. While these laws may have negative practi-
218. For discussion of the ethics law pertaining to similarly compelled disclosures
under § 60501, see supra text accompanying notes 196-215.
219. See supra text accompanying note 203.
220. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(2). For discussion and critique of the lawyer self-
defense exception to the duty of confidentiality, see WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 307-10.
221. The lawyer's right to assets forfeited are determined in a post-conviction hear-
ing at which third parties' status as bona fide purchasers is litigated using a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) (1988).
222. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(2).
223. The jury's determination of the forfeitability of the fee can be viewed as an
allegation that the assets used belonged to the government at the time they were paid to
the lawyer. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57. The post-conviction hearing,
therefore, is the lawyer's opportunity to respond to this allegation by establishing the
applicability of the bona fide purchaser exception to this transfer. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)
(1988).
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cal effects on lawyers and their clients, they do not place lawyers in an
ethical dilemma. The law of ethics structures how the lawyer should
respond to inquiries about such matters, but ultimately it permits the
disclosures that the federal laws compel.
F The Lawyer as Witness
Another issue is whether the money laundering laws raise
problems under ethical rules on lawyers serving as witnesses. 224 In
fact, some have asserted that prosecutors can use the money launder-
ing laws and these ethical prohibitions to disqualify defense counsel
simply by calling them as witnesses, allowing the government to
choose its opponents. 2
25
Two ethical issues arise when lawyers are called to testify in pro-
ceedings in which they are representing clients. 226 One involves the
propriety of the lawyer serving as both an advocate and a witness in
the same matter.227 In certain instances those joint roles are prohib-
ited.228 Even if the merger of the role of advocate and witness is ap-
propriate, however, the second ethical issue must be addressed. This
224. Commentators have noted ethical problems with lawyers serving as witnesses.
See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 191, at 23; Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 73, at 742
("the prospect of the attorney being a witness or providing evidence against the client is a
concept reprehensible in all respects and disastrous in all effects."); Reed, supra note 185,
at 777; Tuite, supra note 212, at 114; Jack B. Zimmerman & Jim E. Lavine, Attorney
Subpoenas Imperil Choice of Counsel, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 51, 51 ("The prosecutor has a
much better chance of winning a case if he or she can unilaterally veto the adversary's
choice of counsel. What lawyer wouldn't love to be able to pick his opponent?"); Had-
dad, supra note 73, at 843; Mass, supra note 73, at 674.
225. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985) (using forfei-
ture, prosecutors "possess the ultimate tactical advantage of being able to exclude compe-
tent defense counsel as they choose. By appending a charge of forfeiture to an indictment
under RICO, the prosecutor could exclude those defense counsel which he felt to be
skilled adversaries."); Gershman, supra note 191, at 23; Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note
73, at 742 ("There appears to be an unlimited discretion within the government to select
the defendant's counsel."). See also United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y.
1991); Arnold H. Lubasch, Judge Disqualifies Gotti's Lawyer from Representing Him at
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at § 1, 1.
226. This is recognized in Richard C. Wydick, Trial Counsel as Witness: The Code
and the Model Rules, 15 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 651, 680 (1982), where the author notes a
two-step approach to advocate-witness issues under the Model Rules.
This discussion focuses on the ethical implications when the government calls crimi-
nal defense lawyers as witnesses. This question also has constitutional implications,
which are discussed infra in notes 343-46 and accompanying text.
227. See MODEL RULEs Rule 3.7; MODEL CODE DR 5-101(B), DR 5-102.
228. There are exceptions to the general prohibition. See MODEL RULEs Rule 3.7
(a)(1)-(3); MODEL CODE DR 5-101(B)(l)-(4).
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issue focuses on the potential conflicts of interest that may arise from
the content of the lawyer's testimony.229 To continue representing a
client, a defense lawyer called as a witness must surmount both ethi-
cal barriers.
1. The Advocate- Witness Problem
Generally, the law of ethics precludes a lawyer from serving as
both a witness and an advocate at trial.230 The purpose of the restric-
tion is to prevent harm to the client,231 to the client's opponent, 232 and
to the judicial system233 that would result from a merger and confu-
sion of the two roles. There are exceptions to the prohibition. Law-
yers can serve in both roles when the testimony relates to an
uncontested matter234 or to the nature and value of legal services ren-
dered in a case. 235 Furthermore, the mixed roles are appropriate
when disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship
on the client.23 6 Application of these provisions indicates that there is
little ethical difficulty presented by the mere merger of the lawyer's
roles as witness and advocate in the money laundering context.
a. Section 60501
A lawyer who does not complete the reporting form on cash pay-
ments under section 60501237 might well be subpoenaed by the gov-
ernment in a summons enforcement action to testify regarding the
facts surrounding the payment.2 38 Such a scenario, however, presents
no problem for the lawyer under the advocate-witness rule.
229. In the Model Rules this issue is handled under the general conflict of interest
provisions, Rule 1.7 pertaining to current clients and Rule 1.9 pertaining to former cli-
ents. WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 383-84.
230. The prohibition is discussed and its rationale critiqued in WOLFRAM, supra
note 130, at 375-90.
231. The client might be harmed by an opponent's easy impeachment of the lawyer-
witness on grounds of interest. Id. at 377.
232. The opponent might feel inhibited in cross-examining a fellow lawyer, or the
testifying lawyer's testimony might be given too much credence. Id. at 377-78.
233. The lawyer might be tempted to commit perjury to win for the client or the
public might view the testimony as likely to be false. Id. at 378.
234. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7(a)(1); MODEL CODE DR 5-101(B)(1) & (2).
235. MODEL RULEs Rule 3.7(a)(2); MODEL CODE DR 5-101(B)(3).
236. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7(a)(3); MODEL CODE DR 5-101(B)(4).
237. The reporting obligation is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 39-46.
238. The reporting obligation of section 60501 is enforced through a summons en-
forcement proceeding. Prior to the institution of such proceedings, the Internal Revenue
Service has attempted to obtain voluntary disclosure through correspondence directed to
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For one thing, the lawyer is testifying in a proceeding distinct
from the criminal action brought against the client and for which the
fee was paid. In the summons enforcement action the lawyer, not the
client, is the respondent, and it is the lawyer's failure to submit the
appropriate form that is at issue.239 The lawyer's testimony will focus
on the client's identity and fee payment in the criminal action,240 and
the lawyer will be required to raise the client's evidentiary privilege
and assert the broader ethical principle of confidentiality. 241 To that
extent the two matters are related. The lawyer called to testify in the
summons enforcement proceeding, however, faces no advocate-wit-
ness problem because there is simply no melding of the two roles there
or in the client's criminal proceeding. 242
Furthermore, even if the section 60501 enforcement action is
viewed as practically intertwined with the client's prosecution,243 the
lawyer's role of witness in the summons enforcement action would
not preclude service as an advocate in the client's criminal proceed-
ing. Model Rule 3.7 generally precludes the lawyer's joint role as ad-
lawyers who have filed Form 8300's omitting information or asserting privilege. See I
Money Laundering Alert 1 No. 3 (Dec. 1989).
239. While section 60501's reporting requirement provides information about the
client to the government, it is considered a compliance provision attempting to trace the
flow of cash income to its recipient, here the lawyer. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
98TH CONG. 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEFIcIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 491 (Comm. Print 1986). That targeting lawyers is
justifiable is shown by a recent General Accounting Office report that identified them as
among the occupational groups that most frequently underreport taxable income. See
General Accounting Office, Tax Administration, Profiles of Major Components of the Tax
Gap, Briefing Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways
and Means, House of Representatives 3, 29 (Apr. 1990).
240. That is, the government will be attempting to obtain only the information re-
quired by Form 8300, a copy of which is appended to this article. That information is
described supra note 43 and accompanying text.
241. The lawyer's duty to raise the client's privilege and the ethical obligation of
confidentiality is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 196-212.
242. The lawyer would be called as a witness under subpoena in the summons en-
forcement action regarding her failure to report under section 60501. This would not
merge the lawyer's role as witness with the lawyer's role as advocate in the criminal trial.
It is the merger of the two roles "at trial" that is the concern of the advocate-witness
prohibition. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7(a). See WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 375.
243. Here we might assume the worst and hypothesize that the government has
utilized § 60501 and the summons enforcement proceeding specifically to obtain an ad-
vantage in the prosecution of the lawyer's client in a separate criminal proceeding. Thus,
the government could be seeking information pertaining to the payment of a cash fee
hoping that it will be helpful in the prosecution.
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vocate-witness at the client's "trial."'244 Under section 60501, the
lawyer's role as witness would be limited to the summons enforce-
ment proceeding and would not be a part of the criminal trial at all.245
Section 60501, therefore, might result in a lawyer being called to
testify regarding the representation of a client. The lawyer's mere role
as a witness in that context, however, would not ethically preclude
serving as an advocate for the client in the criminal action.
246
b. Forfeiture
Fee forfeiture also presents situations in which a lawyer might be
a witness. Three contexts for such testimony are possible. Applica-
tion of the advocate-witness rule, though, reveals that none raises an
ethical dilemma for the lawyer.
First, when the government is investigating forfeiture, the lawyer
might be subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury regarding the fees
paid by a client or benefactor.247 The advocate-witness rule does not
apply to this situation since the lawyer is serving only as a witness
before the grand jury and not in the dual role as advocate and witness
at a trial.248
Second, a lawyer may choose to testify in a post-conviction hear-
ing on third party claims to forfeited assets.249 Once a client is con-
victed and an order of forfeiture has been entered, third parties
seeking to avoid forfeiture of assets in their possession can file a
claim.250 A lawyer might use this procedure to try to qualify as a
bona fide purchaser 25' to avoid forfeiture, although as noted above, it
244. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7(a). See WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 388.
245. As we shall see, even the lawyer-advocate's testimony in the criminal trial itself
does not necessarily run afoul of the advocate-witness rule. See infra text accompanying
notes 265-81.
246. Commentators are not reading the ethical rules carefully, therefore, when they
assert that section 60501 presents a device for the automatic disqualification of defense
counsel. See, e.g., Tuite, supra note 212, at 114 (if lawyer is called to testify about pay-
ment in cash, lawyer may be forced to withdraw because "[c]ertainly, a lawyer cannot be
both advocate and witness.").
247. The government lists in the indictment the assets for which forfeiture is sought.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2). Thus, testimony regarding forfeiture is brought before the
grand jury for their deliberation on the forfeiture count.
248. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7(a). See WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 375 & 388.
249. The post-trial procedures for third party claims to forfeited assets are described
in Reed, supra note 185, at 770-76. For further discussion of these procedures as applied
to lawyers, see supra text accompanying notes 78 & 221.
250. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (1988).
251. Other third parties, such as merchants or providers of nonlegal services, may
1992] 1217
Syracuse Law Review
will be difficult for defense lawyers to qualify.2 5 2 At this point, the
client's "trial" has already been concluded, and the lawyer is only
appearing on his own behalf rather than as the client's advocate.253
At any rate, the lawyer's testimony in such a hearing would be related
to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case.254 For
such testimony there is an express exception to the advocate-witness
rule.25
5
The third situation implicating the advocate-witness rule under
forfeiture laws occurs if the lawyer is called as a witness at the client's
trial to testify regarding the payment of the fee.256 Again, it is likely
that such testimony will fit within the "nature and value of legal serv-
ices" exception to the advocate-witness rule.257 Furthermore, the ap-
plication of the advocate-witness prohibition to disqualify the lawyer
in such situations in some instances wil work a substantial hardship
on the client. 258 This is most likely if the government announces its
intent to call the defense lawyer as a witness late in the pre-trial pro-
also be claimants in these post-conviction proceedings in an attempt to avoid forfeiture of
assets paid them by the convicted defendant.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
253. If he possesses clean assets, the client's interests are also served by the third
parties' success in the post-conviction process. If the third parties avoid forfeiture, the
client need not pay the claimant out of those clean assets.
254. The focus of the post-conviction hearing would be on the value of the services
rendered, as well as on the mens rea of the lawyer when the assets were paid. The statute
requires the third party transferee to prove he or she was a "bona fide purchaser and was
reasonably without cause to believe . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (1988) (emphasis
added). The bona fide purchaser language implicates the value of the services. More-
over, under the Justice Department's voluntary guidelines, the fee cannot be transferred
to the lawyer as a sham transaction "designed to shield from forfeiture assets which
otherwise are forfeitable." DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.410.
In addition, forfeiture will only be pursued if the lawyer had "actual knowledge that the
asset was subject to forfeiture at the time of the transfer." Id. at 9-111.430. Thus, the
lawyer's knowledge at the time of the payment of the fee will also be the subject of the
hearing.
255. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7(a)(2); MODEL CODE DR 5-101(B)(3). See WOLF-
RAM, supra note 130, at 386.
256. When an indictment contains a forfeiture count, the jury at the trial is called
upon to render a verdict as to the forfeitability of the listed assets in the event of the
defendant's conviction. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e). Thus, at the criminal trial itself the
forfeitability of those assets is an issue regarding which testimony will be taken. The
lawyer, as a transferee of some of those assets, may well have relevant knowledge pertain-
ing to those assets and may be called to testify regarding it.
257. See supra text accompanying note 254.
258. The hardship, of course, would result from the economic cost associated with
substitution of counsel and the disruption of the established relationship between the
client and client's chosen counsel.
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cess. 259 If it is a substantial hardship, the ethical rules do not prohibit
the merger of the advocate and witness roles.26° While the testimony
of the defense lawyer on the forfeiture count at the client's trial may
impermissibly join the roles of advocate and witness, therefore, the
exceptions may in many instances permit it.
The likelihood of the advocate-witness rule presenting a difficult
ethical issue for defense counsel is slight. In most situations of law-
yers being called to provide testimony under the laundering laws, the
rule does not apply because the two roles of advocate and witness are
not being merged in a trial. In the few instances when the rule's
broad prohibition might be applicable, the joint role is likely to be
permitted under an exception. The advocate-witness rule under the
law of ethics, therefore, is ill-suited for broad-scale prosecutorial in-
terference with defendants' choice of counsel. 261
2. Conflicts of Interest
A lawyer's testimony regarding representation of a client may
also raise ethical questions involving conflicts of interest. Here the
ethical concern is not the merger of the roles of advocate and witness
but the adverse effect the content of the lawyer's testimony may have
on the client's representation.
Under Model Rule 1.7(b), the representation of a client is gener-
ally precluded when it would be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to a third person or by the lawyer's own interests.262
The lawyer's duty to testify when compelled to do so can be viewed as
a responsibility owed to a third person (the court),263 and the lawyer's
259. The closer to the trial the government's intention to call the defense lawyer as a
witness is announced, the more disruptive it would be to the defense. Thus, the hardship
to the client would increase the later that intention is announced.
260. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7(a)(3); MODEL CODE DR 5-101(B)(4).
261. Lawyers testifying in their clients' proceedings may also raise conflict of inter-
est issues, which are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 262-80. These concerns
may warrant the withdrawal of the lawyer from representing the client in the proceeding
even if the advocate-witness rule does not. Furthermore, the courts' reaction to disquali-
fication motions by prosecutors may be guided more by practical considerations than the
rules of ethics, as discussed infra in part III.
262. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b). The prior Model Code prohibited representations
when the lawyer's "professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably
may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interest." MODEL
CODE DR 5-101(A).
263. The lawyer's duty arises from the subpoena ordering the appearance and testi-
mony. The subpoena is issued by the court, and failure to appear can be punished by the
1992] 1219
Syracuse Law Review
testimony regarding a client's matter might involve the lawyer's own
interests as well.264 Under Model Rule 1.7(b), therefore, the question
is whether the testimony would result in a "material limitation" on
the lawyer's representation of the client.
The mere fact that a lawyer must appear as a witness does not
inevitably create such a limitation.265 In some situations the lawyer's
assertion of the evidentiary attorney-client privilege will shield any
information that might impair the representation. 266 In other in-
stances the lawyer's testimony on non-privileged matters may be
harmless or even favorable to the client and completely consistent
with the client's defense in the criminal action.267 In these situations
there is no limitation on the client's representation created by the law-
yer's testimony.
268
In other situations, a lawyer's testimony might be harmful to the
client but not substantially So. 2 6 9 For example, a lawyer might be
compelled to testify about the payment of the client's fee by another
court through its contempt powers. Thus, the lawyer's duty to testify can be viewed as a
duty owed the court.
264. This would be true in the forfeiture context since the lawyer is interested in
avoiding forfeiture of the fee. Furthermore, the lawyer would be interested in avoiding
her own criminal liability under section 1957.
265. Some commentators view the issue differently, concluding that, if the defense
lawyer is called as a witness, withdrawal is required regardless of the content of the testi-
mony. Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 73, at 742. Certainly the advocate-witness rule
does not always preclude the representation. See supra text accompanying notes 257-61.
Similarly, the conflict of interest rules here under discussion do not compel withdrawal
every time a lawyer is called as a witness in a proceeding involving a client. The focus of
the rules pertaining to the conflict of interest that may arise because the lawyer is called
to testify in a proceeding involving a client is the content of the testimony rather than the
mere merger of the roles of advocate and witness. See WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 383-
84. The specter of the defense lawyer testifying at the trial may raise a practical, nonethi-
cal issue as to disqualification. See infra text accompanying notes 341-49.
266. Reed, supra note 185, at 780-81 (at post-trial forfeiture hearing on third party
claims, lawyer would have to raise privilege as to client communications not bearing on
payment of fee). Privilege is discussed supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
267. For example, the lawyer may have been told nothing by the client that is incon-
sistent with the client's assertion of innocence and the legitimacy of the funds from which
the fee was paid. Similarly, the lawyer's investigation may also corroborate those conten-
tions. While the prosecution might call the defense lawyer to testify, under these circum-
stances the lawyer's testimony would not limit the lawyer's representation of the client in
any way.
268. See WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 383.
269. Model Rule 1.7(b) focuses on a material limitation on the representation.
MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b). The rule apparently contemplates that some limitations on
the representation of a client might be immaterial and not warrant withdrawal. See id.
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person.270 This might be a fact that embarrasses the client or suggests
involvement with the third person, 271 but in many instances it will not
result in additional harm to the client.272 In these instances the testi-
mony could be viewed as a limitation on the representation (the client
might feel wronged) but not a material one.
In certain instances, however, the testimony of the lawyer may
be substantially adverse to the client and compel the conclusion that
the lawyer's representation is materially limited by the lawyer's duty
to testify. The best example of such testimony would be when it is
apparent that the lawyer's own conduct is being investigated as poten-
tially criminal. For instance, if a lawyer is called as a grand jury wit-
ness and his own section 1957 criminal liability is implicated, the
lawyer may attempt to protect himself.273 That self-interest could be
a material limitation on the client's representation, since the lawyer
might be inclined to deflect blame toward the client whose fee pay-
ment created the problem. Another example of testimony that would
seriously affect the client's representation is when the lawyer has non-
privileged knowledge that is substantially harmful to the client.274 In
these situations, the lawyer's duty to testify might well be viewed as
materially limiting the representation of the client.
Even when the lawyer's testimony has this effect, however, the
Model Rules' treatment of the conflict permits some representations
270. This could occur in a summons enforcement proceeding brought to obtain the
information sought by section 60501. The payment of a cash fee requires disclosure of the
name of any third party payor. See infra app. 1 (Form 8300). Similarly, in testimony
relevant to fee forfeiture, a lawyer could be asked about the identity of the party paying
the fee. This would be relevant to the issue of the lawyer's mens rea on the forfeitability
of the assets used to pay that fee.
271. Some clients might be embarrassed by the need to have a third party pay legal
fees. More likely, however, the payment of the fees by a third person could implicate the
client in a broader pattern of criminal activity. The payment could establish a connection
and relationship between the defendant and the payor.
272. In many instances the conspiracy implications of the third party payment will
be more harmful to the third party (since they will be implicated in the crime of the
defendant) than to the defendant himself. Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 73, at 739
(prosecutor may use subpoena of defense lawyer, purportedly regarding the possible for-
feiture of fee, to gather testimony regarding the defendant's financial gain from the crimi-
nal enterprise to assist in obtaining convictions for continuing criminal enterprise or
RICO violations).
273. Here the lawyer could become less concerned with the client's potential crimi-
nal liability than with his own.
274. See WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 383-84. For example, the lawyer may have
witnessed illegal conduct by the client or have received prejudicial communications from
a third party.
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to continue. If the client consents after consultation, Model Rule
1.7(b) allows such representations despite the conflict when the law-
yer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely af-
fected. 275 In determining such adverse effect, the drafters' comments
focus on "the likelihood that the conflict will eventuate and, if it does,
whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent pro-
fessional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of
action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.
276
In some instances when the lawyer's testimony is contrary to the cli-
ent's interests, a reasonable lawyer might nonetheless conclude that
her independent professional judgment would not be impaired by the
conflict.277 If so, an informed client is permitted to consent to the
representation despite the conflict, and no ethical problem precludes
the representation. 278
The ethical restraints on conflicts of interest are not drawn so
broadly as to preclude a representation merely because the defense
lawyer is called as a witness by the prosecution. There will be some
instances when the testimony of the lawyer will so involve the law-
yer's interests (such as when the lawyer's own criminality under sec-
tion 1957 appears possible) or will otherwise be so harmful to the
client that the representation will be adversely affected and should be
275. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b)(1).
276. Id. Rule 1.7 cmt 4.
277. WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 384 ("Under the general conflict of interest
rules, client consent under the Model Rules can remove the adverse-testimony barrier in
all but those rare cases in which the lawyer's adverse testimony so sharply conflicts with
the client's interests that the client's consent is objectively unreasonable."). The point, of
course, is that the possibility of adverse testimony need not necessarily end the represen-
tation due to ethical prohibitions.
278. Model Rule 1.7(b)(2) requires the informed consent of the client for the contin-
uation of the representation even when the lawyer reasonably concludes that the repre-
sentation will not be adversely affected by the potential limitation on the representation.
Thus, the client is permitted to veto the representation even though it appears that no
harm will result. Critics are wrong, therefore, when they assert that a lawyer is automati-
cally disqualified by ethics from continuing the representation whenever they are called as
fact witnesses. See, e.g., Zimmerman & Lavine, supra note 224, at 51. There are excep-
tions to the advocate-witness rule and the conflict of interest rule that may permit the
continuation of the representation despite the defense lawyer's testimony as a witness.
Practically, however, the judge may be concerned about appeals resulting from allega-
tions of conflicts of interest. This may cause the judge to be reluctant to allow the repre-
sentation to continue. Part III of this Article discusses this tendency. See infra text
accompanying notes 341-50.
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discontinued.279 Unless the lawyer is facing potential prosecution or
has non-privileged information seriously harmful to the client, how-
ever, the lawyer generally can ethically continue in the representation
despite being compelled to testify. Ethics law does not compel dis-
qualification whenever the lawyer is called to testify as a witness.280
Many critics of the money laundering laws thus overstate the
ethical restrictions on lawyers serving as witnesses. The advocate-wit-
ness rule would seldom operate to disqualify the lawyer because the
money laundering laws do not provide a likely context for the merger
of those two roles. In the one situation where the roles are merged
(testimony at trial about forfeiture), exceptions to the advocate-wit-
ness rule will sometimes permit the dual roles. Furthermore, while
some testimony offered by a defense lawyer would undoubtedly create
a conflict of interest sufficient to preclude continued representation of
the defendant, not all such testimony would do so. The money laun-
dering laws do allow the prosecutor to disqualify defense lawyers
based on ethics rules in some cases. Furthermore, the power of prose-
cutors to disqualify defense counsel may be expanded by practical
considerations to be discussed in Part IV below. It is not true, how-
ever, that based on ethics law a prosecutor can effectively choose a
defendant's counsel merely by subpoenaing the client's lawyer.
This analysis of the ethical impact of the money laundering laws
on lawyers shows that criticisms of the laws' ethical impact are exag-
gerated. Analyzed carefully, those laws raise no real ethical dilemmas
for criminal defense lawyers which would force them to choose be-
tween unethical and unlawful conduct or between two different types
of unethical conduct. The laws do create contexts in which defense
lawyers must use care to act appropriately under ethics law. And
they certainly engender situations in which lawyers must act contrary
to the interests of their clients and to their own interests as well. But
we should not confuse complexity and disadvantage with ethical diffi-
culty. The laws undoubtedly make defense lawyers' professional lives
more unpleasant, but they do not force lawyers to act unethically.
The public might find lawyers' ethical protests regarding the ap-
plication of the money laundering laws to be particularly hollow.
279. When such a conflict arises, withdrawal from the representation is mandatory.
MODEL RULEs Rule 1.16(a)(1); MODEL CODE DR 2-110(3)(2).
280. While trial judges may disqualify defense lawyers to reduce the likelihood of
appeal, this is not because ethical rules require it, but rather because of constitutional or
practical concerns. This effect of the laws is discussed infra in part III.
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While lawyers object to the laws' impact on their role as zealous advo-
cates, the public may view the laws as an appropriate extension of
lawyers' duties as officers of the court.281 It is ironic that lawyers
(who are trained in investigation, inquiry, and inference and are
sworn to uphold the law) seek to be held to a lower standard than that
imposed on all other sellers of goods and services when it comes to
payments using the proceeds of crime. Members of the public might
legitimately ask whether more should be expected of lawyers in terms
of ethics rather than less.
The limited effect of the laws upon the ethics of lawyers, how-
ever, does not fully describe their impact upon lawyers, clients, and
the judicial system. The practical effects of the laws must also be
evaluated.
III. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT
Beyond the ethical impact of the money laundering laws is the
laws' practical impact on lawyers. 282 Several harmful practical effects
are possible. Below we consider whether the laws "chill" the relation-
ship between clients and lawyers, whether the laws drive some law-
yers away from certain cases, and whether the laws empower
prosecutors to disqualify defense lawyers.
A. Chilled Relationship between Lawyer and Client
One frequent objection to the laws' practical effect is that they
"chill" the relationship between clients and lawyers.28 3 Although
281. For a discussion of the tension between the lawyer's roles as zealous advocate
and officer of the court, see Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND.
L. REv. 39 (1989).
282. For criticisms based on the practical impact, see Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 658 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This Court has
the power to declare [fee forfeiture] constitutional, but it cannot thereby make it wise.");
Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 845 (recounting NACDL argument that section 1957 would
cripple the adversary system).
283. DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 60 (section 60501 and fee forfeiture
"have the potential to rend the fabric of the attorney-client relationship"); Wolfteich,
supra note 1, at 847 n.27 (recounting remarks of Representatives that section 1957 chills
relationship between lawyers and clients); id. at 854 (lawyer testimony on fee forfeiture
chills the confidential relationship between lawyers and clients); Brief Amicus Curiae of
the American Bar Association, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S.
617 (1989) (No. 87-1729) (subpoenas on forfeiture will chill lawyer-client communica-
tions); Adams, supra note 1, at 151:313 ("The ultimate result [of the money laundering
laws being applied to lawyers] may well be a chilling effect on, if not an absolute weaken-
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critics seldom identify how this chilling manifests itself,284 two pos-
sibilities come to mind: stifled communication between lawyers and
clients, and reduced zeal by lawyers on behalf of clients. 285
1. Stifled Communication
The laundering laws might reduce lawyer-client communication
in several ways. Lawyers may not ask their clients as much. Clients
may not reveal as much to lawyers, with or without questions. Fi-
nally, lawyers may not feel as free to advise clients in close cases.
a. Lawyers May Not Ask as Much
We have already discussed the claim that the laws cause lawyers
to ask fewer questions of their clients.286 Fearing fee forfeiture or sec-
tion 1957 criminal liability, a lawyer might choose to remain ignorant
by avoiding areas of inquiry on the origin of a fee payment. By doing
so, the lawyer may hope to preserve a bona fide purchaser defense to
forfeiture or to negate the mens rea element of section 1957. As de-
scribed above,287 however, the laws' actual impact on lawyer inquiry
is likely to be slight.
b. Clients May Not Say as Much
A second way communication may be hindered by the laws is
that regardless of how much the lawyer asks, the client is less willing
to talk.288 The client may fear that the lawyer could be forced to
ing of, the attorney-client relationship as it exists today."). Cf. Genego, supra note 151,
at 41 (noting that four government practices are chilling the relationship between clients
and lawyers).
284. See, e.g., Zimmerman & Lavine, supra note 224, at 54; Wolfteich, supra note 1,
at 854 (lawyer's testimony on fee forfeiture "chills" the confidential relationship between
attorney and client).
285. Some commentators have noted the possibility of the most severe form of "chil-
ling," namely deterrence of the formation of a lawyer-client relationship. See, e.g.,
Capra, supra note 198, at 237 ("what client will seek advice if the very seeking of that
advice can be used against him?").
286. See supra text accompanying notes 74-89. See also Wolfteich, supra note 1, at
847-48 n.27.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
288. See DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 66-67 (open communication by cli-
ent would be "chilled" by attorney giving testimony and "crippled" by the filing of a
section 60501 report); Note, supra note 73, at 842 (when lawyer tries to qualify as bona
fide purchaser to avoid fee forfeiture, effect is to "chill" the relationship between lawyer
and client, making the client less likely to speak freely and openly).
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provide the government with information harmful to the client.289
First it is helpful to identify what information the government
will seek under the laundering laws. For section 1957, the govern-
ment would be investigating whether the lawyer knowingly engaged
in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property over $10,000
that was in fact derived from specified unlawful activity.29° For sec-
tion 60501, the government is entitled to discover the client's and law-
yer's identities, the amount of any cash fee over $10,000, and the
involvement and identity of any third party payors.291 For forfeiture,
the government will seek the amount of the fee, the payor of the fee,
and the method of payment.292
This information sought from the lawyer may well be harmful to
the client. Harm can be hypothesized at most stages of the process.
If the client is not being investigated but consults a lawyer about pos-
sible criminal liability for past acts, a section 60501 report flags the
client for the government and reveals that the client has hired a law-
yer (probably specialized in criminal defense), the identity of the law-
yer, that the client paid a substantial amount (over $10,000 or there
would be no report), and that it was paid in cash.293 For a client who
is already being investigated, the section 60501 report indicates that
the client has large amounts of cash. Similarly, the lawyer's testi-
mony or documents on fee payment, subpoenaed by a grand jury in-
vestigating forfeiture or the lawyer's section 1957 liability, also may
place large amounts of money in the client's hands. This information
may help the grand jury find the elements of the underlying charge.294
Finally, if the lawyer testifies at the client's trial on the issue of forfei-
289. See DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 66 ("If the client simply fears that
[disclosure of confidences] could be compelled, the essential open communication would
be chilled .... ."); Zimmerman & Lavine, supra note 224, at 51 (with grand jury subpoe-
nas to lawyers, "the next thing the client knows, his lawyer is being questioned in secret
about his case. How can the client trust or be honest with that lawyer in the future?").
The potentially harmful impact of section 60501 disclosures is described supra note 213.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57. See also DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.610.
293. With this information, the government may initiate an investigation of the cli-
ent. It could use the FinCEN database to cross-check all currency reports or check the
client's tax returns.
294. See, e.g., Shargel v. United States, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984); DOJ FORFEI-
TURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.620. It reveals the client's access to money.
In the same way, the information may establish a prima facie case of tax evasion.
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ture,295 the information may hurt the defendant in front of the jury by
revealing the client's access to large amounts of money.
Although there are some barriers to the disclosure, lawyers could
be forced to disclose some information harmful to clients under the
laundering laws.296 Sophisticated clients may already be aware of this
295. See supra note 256.
296. The first barrier is that presumably the lawyer would only disclose the informa-
tion if compelled. For section 1957, the compulsion would come in the form of a grand
jury subpoena; for section 60501, in the form of a summons enforcement proceeding; and
for forfeiture, in the form of a grand jury or trial subpoena. The lawyer's testimony at the
third party hearing is voluntary and could not be called "compelled".
Another barrier is the lawyer's own Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Our focus is whether information harmful to the client can be compelled from
the lawyer, but if the information is potentially incriminating to the lawyer as well, the
lawyer may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege. That claim would be based on the
lawyer's potential criminal liability under section 1957. See Axelrod & Harris, supra note
44, at 43 ("Because the scope of Section 1957's attorney fee exception is unclear, and
because the acceptance of more than $10,000 in cash is an element of that offense, in
certain cases the attorney must consider the claiming of his own Fifth Amendment privi-
lege on a Form 8300."); Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 861 n.126. No cases on this issue
have been reported, but it seems likely that a privilege against self-incrimination claim by
a lawyer would shelter at least some information harmful to the client. As for informa-
tion the lawyer could reasonably claim as potentially incriminating under section 1957,
one item is the amount of the fee, because establishing the fee as over $10,000 satisfies an
element of section 1957. Another item is the lawyer's knowledge about the source of the
fee, because it could show that the lawyer knew that the fee was criminally derived. As to
this information, at least, the lawyer could make a reasonable Fifth Amendment claim in
response to government demands.
The Fifth Amendment claim has its limits. The privilege only shields testimonial
evidence, so government subpoenas for physical evidence (like documents) in the lawyer's
possession would generally not be barred. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984);
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Also, once a lawyer claims the Fifth
Amendment, the government can grant immunity and force the lawyer to respond. The
willingness of the government to grant immunity to the lawyer will depend on the gov-
ernment's goal. In a section 1957 investigation, immunity for the lawyer is unlikely.
Since the lawyer is presumably the target, granting immunity would defeat the purpose of
the investigation. In a summons enforcement proceeding under section 60501, the gov-
ernment might offer the lawyer immunity in exchange for the testimony, depending on
whether the government's primary focus is the client or the lawyer. In a grand jury or
trial focusing on forfeiture of the fee, the government would presumably grant the lawyer
immunity because the goal is forfeiture from the client rather than prosecution of the
lawyer. With the lawyer's Fifth Amendment privilege being qualified by the testimonial
limitation and the possibility of immunity, a lawyer could not count on the Fifth Amend-
ment to prevent disclosure of all information.
Other barriers that may prevent lawyer disclosure of information harmful to the
client include the evidentiary attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of confidenti-
ality. Neither will prevent all disclosures. The attorney-client privilege would shield
some information the government might seek, like what the client told the lawyer on how
the client generated the fee. But the attorney-client privilege generally does not cover the
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risk from articles in the popular press.297 Other clients will surely
learn of the risk because the lawyer will tell them about it.29s It would
not be surprising to find clients giving less information to their
lawyers.299
Furthermore, the actual effect on clients may be even greater.
The question of whether the laundering laws force lawyers to disclose
information harmful to clients is complex. Many lawyers probably do
not understand the laws and their application, including the compli-
cating impact of the lawyer's Fifth Amendment privilege and the at-
torney-client privilege. In their confusion, lawyers may exaggerate
the risks of disclosure to protect themselves from claims by clients
that lawyers did not warn them that disclosure might be compelled.300
Even assuming that lawyers understand the laws, when they try to
educate the client on exactly what they might have to reveal, the cli-
ent may not understand. The client may entertain fears of disclosure
identity of the client, the fact of representation, the amount of the fee, and identity of
third party payors. See supra notes 197-98. See also Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 854 n.71.
As to the ethical duty of confidentiality, it does not shield information from disclosure
once a court order is entered. See supra notes 209-11. The attorney-client privilege is
only some protection and the duty of confidentiality is none. So eventually the lawyer
could be compelled to provide some information.
297. See, e.g., U.S. Seeks to Force Law Firms to Name Clients Paying in Cash, CH.
TRIB., Nov. 22, 1989, at 4; Campbell & Grady, supra note 44, at 25.
298. See DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 61 ("Of course, counsel must imme-
diately warn [the client] that, should cash fees ever aggregate to over $10,000, Form 8300
will have to be filed with the Internal Revenue Service, disclosing the client's identity, the
nature of the transaction, and so on."); Gershman, supra note 191, at 26 ("Clearly, the
lawyer must advise the client that the lawyer may have a duty to file a [60501 report]
disclosing the client's identity, the amount of cash received, and the date and nature of
the transaction. The lawyer should also inform the client of the risks of investigation and
prosecution flowing from disclosure of the client's identity and fee information.");
Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 863 n.135 ("One lawyer reads the following warning to poten-
tial clients: 'What you tell me is going to be confidential, except all matters which deal
with future criminality, except all matters which deal with fees to be paid me, and all
matters which deal with the source of the funds with which you are going to pay me. In
other words, as to those areas about which you tell me, I may end up being your prosecu-
tor or at least a witness against you."). See also NACDL op. 90-1, infra note 300.
299. As to section 60501, the threat of disclosure would probably not chill a client's
communication in the sense that the client would hire a lawyer, have the section 60501
form filed and then relate 75% of the story rather than 100%. It is more likely that the
client, upon hearing about the potential disclosure, will be deterred from hiring a lawyer
at all. This is the most extreme form of chilling of the lawyer-client relationship.
300. See NACDL Op. 90-1 (lawyer must advise client of risks of complying with
Form 8300; lawyer may be liable for malpractice for failing to disclose risks if govern-
ment gains advantage from the 8300; client consent is required for disclosure) (cited in
UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 83, at 176 n.12 (Supp. 1990)).
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not grounded in reality and that cannot be dispelled. This would not
be surprising because the advice suggested by some authors is fright-
ening.301 Clients may be reluctant to confide in lawyers, either be-
cause of their own images of what the laws compel lawyers to reveal
or because of scary advice from the lawyers themselves.
Thus clients may not talk as freely to their lawyers because of the
laws. If clients do not, lawyers will be less informed and therefore
provide less effective representation. This is harmful both to the client
and to the adversary system, which is premised upon fully informed
advocates.
c. Lawyers May Not Feel Free to Advise
The laws might also chill the lawyer-client relationship by limit-
ing the advice that lawyers give their clients.302 These laws may
cause lawyers to be more guarded in their advice because they fear
flips30 3 and stings.304
301. Wolfteich, supra note 1, at 863 n.135 (quoted supra note 298).
302. As two authors noted, the chilling goes both ways. See DuMouchel & Oberg,
supra note 1, at 67.
303. See id. (quoting John Wesley Hall, Jr., A Little Paranoia Doesn't Hurt, CHAM-
PION, July 1985, at 21 ("Clients feel tremendous pressure to flip when they know then can
cut their exposure. They will often sacrifice anybody to save themselves.")); Genego,
supra note 156, at 7 (lawyers responding to survey "repeatedly stated that they.., were
less open and more guarded in advising clients because they feared their advice might be
misinterpreted and used against them by a client who might later decide to cooperate
with the government."); UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 83, at 178 (Supp. 1990)
("The more a lawyer knows, the more vulnerable he or she is - not only to the prosecu-
tor, but to the client who may decide to cut a deal in which testimony against the lawyer
is a part."). The possibility that a client would flip on a lawyer is mentioned in the
Department of Justice Guidelines on section 1957. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 16, at
9-105.630 ("Thus, a client's voluntary testimony at trial or a client's voluntary disclosure
of communications with his or her attorney - disclosed, for example, in an attempt to
'make a deal' by implicating the attorney in criminal misconduct - may not [be used to
establish] actual knowledge."). See also Victoria Slind-Flor, Defense Bar Up in Arms:
Lawyer's Arrest is Criticized by Colleagues, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at 30, 30 (defend-
ant facing forfeiture may have "turned" on defense lawyer for a reduction in penalties).
304. Genego, supra note 151, at 7 (at least eleven attorneys reported "specific in-
stances of having been approached by purported witnesses or potential clients who were
working for the government and who, in their disguised capacity, attempted to engage
the attorney in misconduct.").
In September, 1990, Professor Welling spoke with three prominent defense lawyers
at a conference on money laundering. The lawyers were Harvey Silets of Silets & Martin
in Chicago; Charles Blau of Johnson & Gibbs in Dallas; and Kirk Munroe of Richey,
Munroe & Rodriguez, P.A. in Miami. Two of these lawyers thought that they had been
solicited by agents disguised as potential clients. See also United States v. Belcher, 927
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1. Flips
A flip occurs when the client gives evidence to the government
against the lawyer, usually in exchange for more lenient treatment.
For example, a client indicted for drug trafficking might approach the
government and offer to testify that his lawyer knew that the $15,000
fee was derived from drug trafficking, raising possible section 1957
liability for the lawyer. Or a client might offer to testify that her law-
yer suggested that she could avoid any reports of cash transactions by
not paying the lawyer cash and by using two cashier's checks of $7500
each. This testimony would raise potential liability for the lawyer
under section 60501305 and the anti-structuring statute. 3°6
In giving the government new opportunities to prosecute lawyers
in connection with their work, the laundering laws give clients new
leverage against their lawyers. Lawyers are wary of this leverage be-
cause they fear that the government would prefer to prosecute defense
lawyers rather than the usual suspects. 30 7 As one defense lawyer put
it, "If you were a prosecutor would you rather have a drug dealer or a
local criminal lawyer in the dock?" 30 8
Of course, if the client's testimony described above were true, it
would expose the kind of unsavory legal advice and lawyer miscon-
duct the laws were designed to extinguish. These communications are
appropriately chilled.
Yet clients sometimes lie, and lawyers' fear of flips will cause
even legitimate lawyers to eye clients with suspicion, thus undermin-
ing their relationship. One problem with this criticism of the laws is
that if a client is inclined to lie, the client is going to lie regardless of
what the lawyer says. These clients will tell the government what
F.2d 1182 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (lawyer indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 31 U.S.C. § 5324
as part of laundering sting).
305. I.R.C. § 6050I(f)(1) (1988).
306. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988).
307. See DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 67; Hall, supra note 303, at 21; IRS
Serves Summonses to Force Disclosure, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 19, 1990, at 6 (" 'we cannot
allow... the war against drugs to become the war against lawyers .... .' said Neal R.
Sonnett .... Mr. Sonnett called the government's action 'a nationwide assault upon
criminal defense lawyers,' and predicted that 'hundreds of lawyers... will go to jail for
this.' "); Richard Fricker, U.S. Targets Lawyers, A.B.A. J., May 1990, at 19 (" 'This is an
attack on the criminal bar,' Smallwood said.. . . 'The government is making lawyers
their first target.' "). The Justice Department denies any policy of "targeting certain at-
torneys and attempting to prevent them from representing criminal defendants in certain
cases." DOJ FORFEITURE GUIDELINES, supra note 61, at 9-111.530.
308. DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 67; Hall, supra note 303, at 21.
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they think it wants to hear without regard to what the lawyer actually
said. Lawyers should not be chilled from rendering legitimate advice
because with a client who decides to lie, the content of the lawyer's
advice makes no difference anyway.
Even so, somewhere between clients who are telling the truth and
clients who are deliberately lying are clients who misunderstand legit-
imate advice.30 9 Lawyers who fear prosecution might forego compli-
cated but legitimate advice for fear the client would misunderstand
and then testify against the lawyer. If so, their clients would be de-
prived of legitimate advice.
2. Stings
Another practical impact is that lawyers' communication to cli-
ents may be chilled by fear of stings.310 Stings are investigations
where government undercover agents create an opportunity and invite
the target to commit a crime. Regardless of whether the government
is using this undercover approach, defense lawyers fear they are being
targeted for stings by purported clients who are actually government
agents trying to catch them in violations of section 1957 or section
309. For instance, assume a client hires a lawyer and tenders the $15,000 retainer in
cash. The lawyer tells the client about the § 60501 reporting requirement, and the client
questions the lawyer. The lawyer might provide three pieces of advice:
(1) A section 60501 report is not required if the client pays the $15,000 with a
personal check.
(2) A section 60501 report can be avoided if the client pays the retainer with a
$15,000 cashier's check purchased from a bank, although the bank will file a cash trans-
action report.
(3) All reports of cash transactions can be avoided if the client pays the retainer
with two $7500 cashier's checks purchased from different banks.
Advice (1) is clearly legal and is being commonly given. See Fred Strasser et al.,
Fee-Reporting Requirements Get Even Tighter, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 17, 1990, at 5 (quoting
Terrance Reed). Advice (3) is clearly illegal. Advice (2) is less clear. The express lan-
guage of section 60501(f) suggests it may be illegal. See I.R.C. § 6050I(f) ("No person
shall for the purpose of evading the return requirements of this section - (A) cause or
attempt to cause a trade or business to fail to file a return required under this section....
or (C) structure or assist in structuring ... any transaction with one or more trades or
businesses.") (emphasis added). But a policy argument could be made to support the
legality of the advice because the lawyer is not counseling the avoidance of all reports, but
is counseling the client to set up the transaction so that one type of report rather than
another is filed. The government has a right to notice of cash transactions but not neces-
sarily cash transactions at a lawyer's office. The point is that the line between legal and
illegal advice is fuzzy even for lawyers, and it may be lost on the client.
310. See supra note 303.
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60501.311 Such fears limit candor. 312
For lawyers giving illegal advice or otherwise committing crimes
under these laws, we hope they are scared into legitimacy by the
threat of a sting. Conversely, it could be said that lawyers giving only
legitimate advice, they have nothing to fear from stings. As described
above, though, the line between legal and illegal advice is not always
vivid. Even indulging the assumption that a government agent would
not lie, the agent would want the investigation to bear fruit and so
would have some incentive to construe ambiguity against the lawyer.
The temptation for the government agent to distort the facts is not as
great as it is with ffipping clients who hope to trade the lawyer's crim-
inal liability for relief from their own troubles, but government agents
do have some incentive. Even honest lawyers, therefore, might legiti-
mately fear the possibility of stings based on the laundering laws.313
Yet lawyers have always faced the threat of flips and stings, even
before the laundering laws were adopted. A client might flip and tes-
tify that the lawyer suborned perjury,314 obstructed justice31 5 or tam-
pered with witnesses. 316 A sting might target lawyers for bribery, like
Operation Greylord in Chicago.317 Still, the laundering laws not only
311. See id. For example, the government might send in an agent posing as a client
who hires the lawyer and pays a fee of $15,000 in cash but demands that the lawyer
forego the section 60501 report. There is some evidence the government is using this
approach. See United States v. Belcher, 927 F.2d 1182 (1lth Cir. 1991) (lawyer indicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 31 U.S.C. § 5324 as part of laundering sting; not section
1957 or section 60501, but clearly government is using stings against lawyers). See gener-
ally Genego, supra note 151, at 3 ("The techniques prosecutors are using [including] ...
attempts to entrap attorneys through 'clients' who are in fact working with the govern-
ment - are seen by the defense bar as part of a general prosecutorial program to target
vigorous and successful attorneys for government harassment and to discourage attorneys
from representing criminal defendants.") The Department of Justice denies this. See
supra note 307.
312. See Genego, supra note 151, at 7, where the author reports that at least 11
lawyers mentioned that they thought they had been the target of a sting operation. Pro-
fessor Genego does not draw any conclusion specifically related to these reports. We
might predict the reaction of lawyers to being targeted for sting operations. Lawyers
might be chilled in what they say to clients or in their zeal or willingness to represent
these clients.
313. A sting may begin as a flip, but once it ripens into a sting, meetings are gener-
ally taped, and risk to the lawyer that other parties will lie about what was said decreases.
314. See 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1988).
315. See id. §§ 1501-16.
316. See id. § 1512.
317. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1988); Ward v. United
States. 845 F.2d 1459 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Edward Frost, Top P1 Lawyer Convicted,
A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 28 (lawyers will be "chilled" by lawyer's conviction for bribing
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increase the number of opportunities for flips and stings, they also
describe conduct that lawyers can be envisioned doing. Thus the laws
provide new opportunities for the government and an increased
awareness of the risks for lawyers.
3. Subdued Zeal
Another manifestation of the "chilled" relationship between cli-
ents and lawyers may be generally reduced advocacy. Because clients
are worried about what lawyers may have to reveal and lawyers are
worried about clients ffipping, the relationship is less trusting. Even if
communication is not reduced, the relationship could be otherwise
affected. In such an atmosphere, it would not be surprising to find
that lawyers unconsciously reduce the intensity of their efforts for
clients.
B. Lawyers Driven Away from Some Cases
In addition to concerns that the money laundering laws chill the
lawyer-client relationship, another danger is that the laws cause law-
yers to decline particular cases318 or particular types of cases.319 Some
witnesses). Another example of such stings is United States v. Feaster, 843 F.2d 1392
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988) (lawyer advising an undercover agent on
evasion of taxes charged with aiding preparation of a false tax return).
318. See, eg., United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (D. Md. 1986),
ajTd, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987) (lawyers facing possible forfeiture of assets gave notice
to the court that their continued appearance in the case was conditional on their fees
being exempt from forfeiture); Brickey, Tainted Assets, supra note 1, at 54 (describing a
hypothetical case where a defense lawyer is deterred from taking a case by the threat of
section 1957 liability); Peter L. Zimroth, When Defense Goes Begging, NAT'L L.J., June
25, 1990, at 13 (describing how four lawyers representing General Noriega asked to re-
sign from the case because of fee forfeiture); Linda P. Campbell, Drug War Spotlight is on
Legal Fees Issue, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 1989, at 21 (lawyer turns down three clients be-
cause they could not assure lawyer fee was untainted).
319. UNDERWOOD & FORTuNE, supra note 83, at 409 ("The potential effect of [fee
forfeiture] provisions on the ability of RICO and CCE defendants to retain counsel is
obvious.") (presumably this is a criticism); id. at 177 (Supp. 1990) ("For the private de-
fense bar there is no bright side to Caplin & Drysdale."); Genego, supra note 167, at 842;
Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 73, at 739 (lawyers may refuse to be retained in cases
involving fee litigation); Margolin & Battson, supra note 73, at 27 (lawyers driven out of
RICO and CCE cases); Haddad, supra note 73 at 848 ("Criminal defense attorneys are
avoiding these problems by simply refusing to represent clients who may be subject to
asset forfeiture."); Roderick D. Vereen, Note, Attorneys' Rights to Fees Under the CFA of
1984: The 'Bona Fide Purchaser', 16 S.U. L. REv. 407, 415 (1989) (decision by United
States Supreme Court in favor of fee forfeiture may cause chilling effect on attorneys who
would otherwise represent RICO defendants); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar
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say the laws cause defense lawyers to quit federal criminal law alto-
gether.320 The reasons given for lawyers quitting is that they are in-
timidated by the government's increased power,321 which forces them
to face the risk of losing their fees322 and the increased risk of prosecu-
tion.323 Furthermore, the steps lawyers must take to avoid liability
under these laws are inconvenient, 324 complicated, and an additional
time drain on the regular workload.325 For some lawyers, the argu-
Association at 2, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)
(No. 87-1729) (brief on petition for certiorari) ("The mere prospect of fee forfeiture may
deter many lawyers from undertaking a criminal representation."); Richard L. Fricker,
Dirty Money, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 64 (lawyers avoiding cases with forfeiture or
drugs); Anne Stark Gallagher, RICO Risks, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 28 (lawyers shying
away from drug cases); IRS Launches Crackdown on Attorneys' Cash, MONEY LAUN-
DERING ALERT, No. 3, Dec. 1989, at 2 ("The strains of the government's pursuit and the
fee seizures have caused some lawyers to renounce narcotics defense work."); Campbell,
supra note 318, at 24 (lawyers shying away from drug cases).
320. DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 60 ("Some members of the defense bar
might be forced out of the field altogether.. . ."); Genego, supra note 151, at 39 (sixteen
lawyers reported quitting federal criminal law altogether); Mass, supra note 73, at 678
("If complex cases were increasingly handled through appointment, many successful de-
fense lawyers might leave the field, choosing to enter more financially rewarding areas of
practice."); Gershman, supra note 191, at 22 ("Many... defense attorneys will be driven
out of defense work" by, inter alia, section 60501 reporting requirements and fee forfei-
ture); Fricker, supra note 319, at 64 ("Many [criminal defense lawyers] are simply getting
out of criminal law ... ."); Margolin & Battson, supra note 73, at 29-30 (initial govern-
ment success with forfeiture "sent seismic shocks through the community of defense law-
yers, deterring many from the honest pursuit of a noble profession." [footnote omitted]).
321. Genego, supra note 151, at 41 (discussing the "sense of fear and intimidation"
experienced by criminal defense lawyers).
322. The fears of fee forfeiture are described in UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra
note 83, at 177 (Supp. 1990) ("[T]here is little doubt but that the Forfeiture Act, as
construed in Caplin & Drysdale, places the 'white powder bar' in the awkward position of
economic dependence on the restraint and good will of the Justice Department.") (foot-
notes omitted); Mass, supra note 73, at 675 (attorneys would not be willing to undertake
long, complex defenses if there is a possibility that their fees will be forfeited); Gallagher,
supra note 319, at 28 (after forfeiture held constitutional, some lawyers may change their
practices, shunning the now risky representation of defendants in RICO and narcotics
cases).
323. Fear of prosecution under section 1957 is described in Wolfteich, supra note 1,
at 867 (describing a "host of uncertainties" under 1957 that may deter a lawyer from
taking a case); Gallagher, supra note 319, at 28 (describing threat of prosecution under
section 1957 as "special concern" of lawyers in RICO and narcotics cases).
324. For example, lawyers avoiding the reach of section 1957 would need to plan to
limit the fee to below $10,000 or wait until after indictment to deposit the funds. Law-
yers dealing with section 60501 would have to file Form 8300. All this is inconvenient
and distracting. See also Brickey, Tainted Assets, supra note I, at 54.
325. The lawyer would have to research the laws to understand what is required.
This is time-consuming (as I well know) because the laws are so different from each other
(one substantive crime, one tax reporting requirement, and one criminal sanction) and
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ment goes, the cases are not worth it.
There is evidence that the laundering laws are driving lawyers
away from some types of cases. Empirical evidence appears in Profes-
sor Genego's study,326 which found that 14% of lawyers surveyed had
declined a specific case or cases as a result of government practices
often associated with the laundering laws. 32 7 Case law supports the
fact that some attorneys refuse to take a case if fee forfeiture is
threatened. 328 Finally, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that
lawyers are being driven away from certain types of cases.329
Although the extent is hard to gauge,330 the evidence indicates that
some lawyers are being deterred by practices associated with the
they are complex and new. They are not codified together, but are scattered throughout
titles 18, 21, and 26 of the U.S. Code. Moreover, the laws are complicated by regulations
(for section 60501) and Department of Justice guidelines (for section 1957 and fee
forfeiture).
326. See Genego, supra note 151, at 2.
327. Professor Genego's study is based on data he collected by sending question-
naires to members of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. The ques-
tions focused on five specific prosecution practices, including the receipt of grand jury
subpoenas, the receipt of summonses from the IRS, the government's use of confidential
informants at defense meetings involving multi-defendant representation, attempts to for-
feit money paid to attorneys or to prevent a defendant from using his or her assets to pay
attorney's fees, and efforts to disqualify an attorney from representing a particular de-
fendant. Grand jury subpoenas to lawyers are associated with the laundering laws be-
cause subpoenas are used to seek fee forfeiture information. Two other practices, IRS
summonses under section 60501 and attempts to forfeit money paid to attorneys under
forfeiture laws, are directly attributable to the laundering laws. To a large extent, Profes-
sor Genego's survey reflects the impact of the laundering laws.
328. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 852
F.2d 1400 (1988) (en banc), rev'd, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); United States v. Bassett, 632 F.
Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986), afid, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
329. In September, 1990, Professor Welling spoke with three prominent criminal
defense lawyers at a conference on money laundering. The lawyers were Harvey Silets of
Silets & Martin in Chicago; Charles Blau of Johnson & Gibbs in Dallas; and Kirk Mun-
roe of Richey, Munroe & Rodriguez, P.A. in Miami. All three said they had changed
their practices to decline cases upon hearing that certain elements were involved. The
factor that made them most likely to refuse a case was large scale drug trafficking. See
also Campbell, supra 318, at 24 (lawyers shying away from drug cases); Gallagher, supra
note 319, at 28 (Milwaukee attorney chilled into refusing drug cases); Fricker, supra note
319, at 64 (" 'I'm getting calls from all over the country,' says Sonnett. 'Many are simply
getting out of criminal law or are just refusing to take cases involving forfeiture.' ").
330. Professor Genego identifies two possible biases affecting the validity of the
study. First, the population (members of NACDL) may have been more likely to have
been affected by the prosecutorial practices in question. Second, the likelihood that a
lawyer would respond to the questionnaire probably is greater if the lawyer had been the
subject of any of the practices. Genego, supra note 151, at 5. Professor Genego believes
that the results are significant in spite of these possible biases. Id.
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money laundering laws from taking certain cases.33'
But why should we worry? What is the harm if some lawyers are
disinclined to take the kinds of cases where these laundering issues
come up? One obvious harm is to defense lawyers themselves. For
them the laws mean there are now fewer clients in the world for
whom they are willing to work, so their caseload and income might
decrease.332 This impact will be hard on defense lawyers, but it is
probably not the type of harm that would kindle a rejection of the
laundering laws.
The second harm which results from driving attorneys out is
harm to clients because their choice of counsel is limited as a practical
matter.333 They may not get to hire the lawyer they would most pre-
fer. Yet the effect of the laws on clients' choice of counsel should not
be overstated. Several factors operate to prevent wide scale abandon-
ment of federal criminal defense work. For one thing, those most ex-
perienced and renowned for their work in this field might be reluctant
to turn their backs on such cases. Such expertise and reputation
would make the opportunity costs in turning to other work high.334
Additionally, these lawyers might be inclined to deal with the added
331. Lawyers not driven away are making changes. See, e.g., Genego, supra note
151, at 3, 7 & 39 (46% say they made some changes in their practice, including keeping
fewer records or far more records); Axelrod & Harris, supra note 44, at 6, 42 (results of
survey showing that "[s]ome attorneys who accepted cash fees in the past no longer do so
because of the difficulty of resolving problems flowing from section 60501 .... ").
332. Gershman, supra note 191 at 22 ("Many... defense attorneys will be driven
out of defense work, unwilling to deal with the pressures, harassment, and potential loss
of income" caused by prosecutors using, inter alia, § 60501 and fee forfeiture). Concern
over the threat to income raised by fee forfeiture is expressed in Campbell, supra note
318, at 24 (forfeiture "puts every privately retained attorney's income and professional
career in jeopardy.... I don't believe the problem can be overstated." (quoting Michael
Monico, a former federal prosecutor)).
333. See Brickey, Tainted Assets, supra note 1, at 55-56 (describing courts' fears of
the "in terrorem" impact of fee forfeiture on the availability of private counsel); Margolin
& Battson, supra note 73, at 27; Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association at
16, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (No. 87-1729)
The choice of counsel is probably not so limited by the exit of some attorneys that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is implicated. At least as to fee forfeiture, that
choice of counsel issue was resolved in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto. As to whether
the result would change when courts consider the combined impact of forfeiture and
section 60501 and section 1957, it seems unlikely.
334. Recognition of the opportunity costs is implicit in a comment by defense law-
yer Allen Smallwood. In lamenting how lawyers are being called before grand juries, he
said, "'I wish there was a way for me to make a good living doing something else.'"
Fricker, supra note 307, at 19.
1236 [Vol. 43:1165
Money Laundering & Lawyers
risks and complexity of such cases by charging a suitably higher fee.
Perhaps these higher fees would also attract other capable lawyers to
this field of practice even if others, more risk-averse, abandon it. In
short, normal market forces might well operate to keep some of the
best criminal defense lawyers in the field or to encourage other law-
yers to enter it, despite the difficulties presented by the money laun-
dering laws. It is not clear, therefore, that the range of counsel for
defendants to choose from will be seriously reduced by the laws.335
In addition to the effect on lawyers and clients, other practical
impacts of the laundering laws can be seen in terms of harm to the
adversary system. This argument asserts that the system is based on
adversaries having independent strength and roughly equivalent
power and that the laws tilt the balance too much in favor of the
government, thus skewing the process.3 36 Furthermore, the argument
goes, deterring defense lawyers from taking complex cases inhibits
their education and development, again making them less worthy ad-
versaries.337 Finally, court-appointed defenders are good, 33 8 but they
are not funded or equipped to take over all the cases that private law-
335. See Brickey, Tainted Assets, supra note 1, at 55-56.
336. Genego, supra note 151, at 41 (four practices' practical impact on lawyers "im-
pede the proper functioning of adversary process by affecting one side's ability to prepare
and present its case on the merits."); DuMouchel & Oberg, supra note 1, at 66 (adversary
system needs strong and independent advocates); id at 82 (forfeiture and section 60501
are hurting the adversary system; independent defense bar is important to the adversary
system); Mass, supra note 73, at 677-78 (fee forfeiture unbalances system); Zimroth,
supra note 318, at 13 ("The demise of the private defense bar, . . . will mean a serious
diminution of the adversary system and therefore of an independent judiciary.").
This argument is related to a constitutional argument raised in Caplin & Drysdale.
See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989). (arguing that
the forfeiture statute was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
because it permits the government to upset the balance of forces between the accused and
the accuser) (citing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)). The Supreme Court
rejected this argument on the basis that the fact that the power could be abused does not
render the law facially invalid. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 634-35. Although the
law is not unconstitutional based on the potential for abuse, it might be unwise for that
reason. The concept of "equality of arms" in the criminal justice system is thoroughly
explored in Jay S. Silver, Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New Constitu-
tional Right, 1990 WIs. L. REv. 1007 (1990).
337. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association at 8, Caplin & Drys-
dale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (No. 87-1729) (brief on petition for
certiorari) ("[B]y deterring counsel from accepting many important criminal cases, fee
forfeiture may inhibit the education and development of defense attorneys qualified to
undertake such representation."). The ABA brief does not explicitly identify the harm
resulting from inhibited development of defense lawyers. Inhibited development is harm-
ful to the individuals involved for obvious reasons. We have assumed that it is also harm-
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yers may reject.339
Should the best and most experienced defense lawyers decide to
abandon federal criminal law, the system would undoubtedly suffer.
Surely defendants and our sense of justice are not best served by a
chronic adversarial mismatch in the most complex criminal cases.
Until the flight of the best defense lawyers 34 from the field is more
clearly documented, such an effect on our criminal justice system re-
mains speculative. But some danger signals are present, and this
practical impact should not be ignored.
C. Prosecutors' Power to Disqualify Defense Lawyers
We have analyzed the situation where the prosecutor, alleging a
need to call the defense lawyer as a witness, can have the lawyer dis-
qualified from representing the client.341 We noted above that this is
not an ethical issue because ethics law generally does not compel the
disqualification. 342 The disqualification may result because of judges'
fear that if the lawyer who will be testifying is not disqualified, the
client may be able to get any conviction reversed based on a violation
of the right to effective assistance of counsel.343 Clients may succeed
ful to the system because underdeveloped defense lawyers are easier and less worthy
adversaries for prosecutors.
338. See Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel,
Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J.
361 (1991).
339. See Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 73, at 739. But cf Feeney & Jackson,
supra note 338, at 407-09 (type of defense counsel is not an important determinant of
outcome, but best criminal defense lawyers clearly do make a difference).
340. Are the ones leaving the field "the best"? Cf Genego, supra note 151, at 40-41
(lawyers most experienced and successful in terms of income were most likely to be sub-
jected to the four practices). See also Gershman, supra note 191, at 22 (most talented and
aggressive lawyers will be driven out).
341. The discussion of the lawyer as witness issue is found supra in text accompany-
ing notes 230-80.
342. The advocate-witness rule would seldom require the disqualification of the law-
yer. See supra text accompanying notes 237-61. Similarly, except when the lawyer is
called to give unprivileged testimony adverse to her client's interests, the ethical rules on
conflict of interest would not compel the lawyer's disqualification. See supra text accom-
panying notes 262-90.
343. This concern of the federal district courts is noted in Wheat v. United States,
486 U.S. 153, 157, 161 (1988). The Court additionally noted the federal courts have an
independent interest that criminal trials in those courts "are conducted within the ethical
standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe
them." Id. at 160 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the Court thus indicates
that the courts may legitimately be concerned with appearances, even if those concerns
exceed the dictates of legal ethics. Under this approach, a judge might well react more
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on this claim even if they were fully informed and waived the conflict
at the time.344 The trial judge can constitutionally disqualify the de-
fense lawyer over the client's objection.
Thus disqualification is usually not an ethical problem, and the
Supreme Court has concluded that disqualification is not a constitu-
tional problem. The practical impact of disqualification, however, is a
problem.3 45 Clients are deprived of the lawyers they want and can
afford. Lawyers lose the business and the opportunities to help clients
to whom they may be committed.3 46 For the justice system, disquali-
fication gives a big advantage to prosecutors.3 47 The power of the liti-
gants shifts when one litigant has the opportunity to disqualify the
opposing litigant's lawyer. Since no similar power resides in defense
lawyers, the presumed parity of the advocates is diminished.3 48 This
negatively than the ethical rules demand to the defense lawyer's continued participation
in the trial once called as a witness by the prosecutor. WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 383-
84.
Testimony at trial about fee forfeiture is most likely to raise this problem. In this
situation, the lawyer is testifying in the criminal trial itself. When that testimony is ad-
verse to the client it might have a negative impact on the issue of guilt on the underlying
charge. This testimony is heard by the jury. The lawyer's testimony in summons en-
forcement proceedings to inquire about the section 60501 reporting of a cash transaction
or in a grand jury inquiry into the lawyer's own criminal liability under section 1957
seems less likely to raise this direct prejudicial effect to the defendant-client. Even though
the ethical rules might permit this testimony and the continued representation in some
situations (that is, the defense lawyer would not be subject to discipline), the trial judge
could be expected to exercise her broad discretion over the proceedings to disqualify the
defense lawyer despite any claims that the representation would not be adversely affected
and that the client had consented. See, e.g., Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161-62 (not all subpoenas
of defense lawyers should result in their disqualification.); In re Grand Jury Matter, 926
F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1991) (disqualification is not necessary when the information can be
provided so as to avoid that result).
344. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163.
345. In one case, the defense lawyer for John Gotti was disqualified by a federal
district judge upon the motion of the prosecutor. United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp.
552 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). News reports indicate that the prosecutor claimed the defense
lawyers were potential witnesses to the client's alleged racketeering crimes. Lubasch,
supra note 225, at 1. (The defense lawyer, Bruce Cutler, claimed that the disqualification
was sought because he had been successful in having his client acquitted in three previous
trials on other criminal charges). The same allegation was made by the defendant in
Wheat when the prosecutor sought to deny substitution of counsel. Wheat, 486 U.S. at
157.
346. The practical problems of disqualification for defense lawyers and clients are
exacerbated because pretrial disqualification of defense lawyers in criminal proceedings
are not immediately appealable. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
347. Capra, supra note 198, at 237 (disclosure of adverse information by lawyer
"skews the adversary system through ad hoc disqualification.").
348. Such a disparity was noted by the dissenters in Caplin & Drysdale. In review-
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shift of power to prosecutors is a harmful practical impact of the laun-
dering laws.349
Thus the money laundering laws do have some harmful practical
impacts on clients, lawyers, and the adversary system. The lawyer-
client relationship will be chilled by communication being impaired.
Although lawyers will probably not be deterred from asking ques-
tions, clients may well be deterred from speaking candidly by fears
that lawyers will have to disclose information. Moreover, lawyers
may be reluctant to give clients good faith, lawful advice on complex
matters due to fears of client ffips and government stings. With the
ing the constitutionality of the forfeiture laws, they found particularly troubling the gov-
ernment's ability under those laws "to exercise an intolerable degree of power over any
private attorney who takes on the task of representing a defendant in a forfeiture case."
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 650 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Of particular concern there was the selective use of restraining orders to
freeze legal fees of the most talented or agressive defense lawyers hired by defendants. Id.
Of course, the power to disqualify a defense lawyer by calling her as a witness is an even
more direct way for a prosecutor to exercise power over an opponent.
While courts are understandably concerned about preventing the possibility of re-
versible error in criminal trials, widespread tactical use of disqualification by the prosecu-
tion might lead courts to be more inclined to accept defendant's waivers. The court might
choose to assure itself that the client-defendant has made a knowing, voluntary waiver of
the right to conflict-free representation. This would protect the legitimate interest of the
government in obtaining a conviction not subject to challenge on Sixth Amendment effec-
tive representation of counsel grounds, at least if the courts would view the waiver as
precluding such claims. See WOLFRAM, supra note 130, at 420. It would permit the
accused to have counsel of choice.
For a discussion of the need for parity between the advocates in criminal cases in the
constitutional context, see Silver, supra note 336. See also Cloud, supra note 1.
349. It is possible that the "informal professional culture" that is said by some to
exist among prosecutors and defense lawyers, discussed at supra note 131, may operate as
a practical check on abuse of this prosecutorial power to call the defense lawyer as a
witness in order to disqualify him. Additionally, the likely complications and contro-
versy generated by the subpoena of a defense lawyer may well serve as a practical check
on the power's abuse. One Assistant United States Attorney indicated this in an inter-
view with one of the authors, saying, "Whenever I even think about subpoenaing a de-
fense lawyer, I get a headache." Furthermore, the Department of Justice has adopted
internal limits on the use of subpoenas against defense lawyers. In the case of grand jury
subpoenas, prior approval must be obtained from the Assistant Attorney General of the
Criminal Division. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 17, at 9-2.161(a)(E). Review of those re-
quests must balance the need for the information and the potential adverse effects upon
the attorney-client relationship, especially the risk that the defense lawyer will be disqual-
ified. Like the Department of Justice guidelines on section 1957 and forfeiture, however,
these guidelines are not binding on the government.
At least one U.S. Attorney has stated that subpoenas to defense lawyers regarding
present or former clients are extremely rare. Bonner, supra note 1, at 803 (fewer than one
in 1000 subpoenas issued to attorneys during prior three-year period).
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lawyer-client relationship chilled and distrusting, it would not be sur-
prising to see an overall reduction in quality and intensity of advocacy
by criminal defense lawyers. Furthermore, there is some evidence
that the most experienced defense lawyers are being driven off from
cases involving the money laundering laws. Even if other lawyers step
in, it will be the community's and criminal justice system's loss if ex-
perienced, creative defense lawyers are driven to other kinds of work.
Finally, the laws create additional opportunities for prosecutors to
disqualify defense counsel in specific cases. This engenders a mis-
match that detracts from the quality of the adversary system.350 The
laws may not have harmful ethical impacts, but they do have harmful
practical impacts.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have explored the impact of the federal money
laundering laws on lawyers. We are cautious in claiming that our
treatment is exhaustive. It is impossible to anticipate all the ways
these laws will be used by creative prosecutors and reacted to by
equally creative defense lawyers. Moreover, our analysis necessarily
relies upon some assumptions regarding the way lawyers and clients
act. These assumptions have not been verified and may not be verifia-
ble. We are confident in our conclusions but recognize that other as-
sumptions would justify different conclusions.351
We have assessed the impact of the money laundering laws on
lawyers in the absence of the Department of Justice's guidelines. This
approach is justified by the precatory nature of the guidelines which
leaves the potential impact of the laws undiminished. Still, it is im-
portant to remember that because these guidelines reduce the laws'
effect on lawyers, our discussion has adopted a worst case outlook.
With these caveats, we can draw several conclusions. The fed-
eral money laundering laws make the practice of law less pleasant for
350. The dissenters in Caplin & Drysdale perceived the harm to the adversary sys-
tem from fee forfeiture to be considerable. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 648 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting)("Had it been Congress' express aim to undermine the adversary
system as we know it, it could hardly have found a better engine of destruction than
attorney's-fee forfeiture.").
351. This point was made regarding the attorney-client privilege in Goode, supra
note 197, at 313 ("Most of the arguments surrounding the attorney-client privilege are
based on unverified, and probably unverifiable, assumptions about the conduct of clients
and lawyers. This leaves commentators free to make diametrically opposed, yet plausible
assertions, about the real-world consequences of the privilege.").
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defense lawyers. The laws take lawyers' time, complicate their work-
load, require them to take actions contrary to their clients' and their
own interests, make collection of fees riskier, and expose them to
criminal prosecution for accepting some fees. It is understandable
that defense lawyers lament the effect of the laws on their lives.
However, the laws do not place defense lawyers in ethical dilem-
mas. Critics who claim that the laws force lawyers to choose between
the unsavory alternatives of illegal acts and ethical misconduct state
the case inaccurately. This is not to say that the money laundering
laws do not have an impact on lawyers' ethics. They do create more
instances where lawyers must act cautiously to avoid ethical viola-
tions. With one exception, though, the laws generate only familiar
ethical situations that present the types of pressures that lawyers must
resist daily and that are addressed directly in the ethical rules. The
exception is the contingent fee issue raised by the application of forfei-
ture to legal fees, but even that matter rises to the level of an ethical
dilemma only through the most wooden and unlikely application of
the rule on contingent fees. Arguments against the laws based on ir-
resoluble ethical problems, therefore, are not persuasive.
The laws do have several practical impacts that are troubling. It
is likely that the laws and the publicity surrounding them cause cli-
ents to be more circumspect in the information they disclose to their
lawyers, which may lead to defense lawyers being less informed. De-
fense lawyers' fear of the laws may hamper them from giving lawful
advice to clients or otherwise reduce their zeal. The complications
and risks created by the laws may be causing talented and experienced
defense counsel to abandon certain types of criminal cases or criminal
law altogether. Finally, when coupled with trial courts' desire to
avoid reversal, the laws create new opportunities for prosecutors to
disqualify defense lawyers by calling them as witnesses. These practi-
cal effects are difficult to document or to quantify. They appear, how-
ever, to be likely results of the application of the money laundering
laws to lawyers, and there is some evidence that they are occurring.
The likely practical impact of the laws is disturbing at two levels.
At the personal level, the laws may be reducing the quality of the
representation received by some defendants charged with serious
crimes. More importantly, at the systemic level the laws may tip the
present balance of the adversary process significantly in favor of the
prosecution. For the government, the laws may offer the attractive
prospect of having less informed, less zealous, less talented, and less
experienced opponents. Should a defense lawyer still prove to be too
1242 [V/ol. 43:1165
Money Laundering & Lawyers
formidable an adversary, the laws may tempt prosecutors to seek dis-
qualification. We are unwilling to assume that a U.S. Attorney would
try to disqualify a defense lawyer just because she's good, without a
primafacie case of wrongdoing. We trust prosecutors but maintain a
healthy skepticism on whether it is wise to give them more power.
Such a shift of power toward the government, apparently unintended
by Congress, creates legitimate concern about the continuing fairness
of the federal criminal justice process.
Certainly society derives numerous, significant benefits from
these laws. The money laundering laws are valuable weapons against
drug trafficking and other organized crime. We have made no effort
in this article to enumerate or assess these benefits. The laws' practi-
cal impact tending toward the creation of a perpetual adversarial mis-
match in some criminal cases, however, has disturbing implications.
In the debate about the money laundering laws' application to crimi-
nal defense lawyers, the focus on ethics is unconvincing and too nar-
row. As this article has explained, the issue is better framed by
focusing on the laws' practical impact on the fairness of the criminal
justice system.
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APPENDIX 1, FORM 8300
8300 Report of Cash Payments Over $10,000Received in a Trade or Business OBNo 15,500
(Rev Febray 1992) Failure to file this form or filing a false form may result m irnlsonimenL Exp D9-30-94
o t 01 t* Teay I See mstructiorn;."-o R- S- F 1 Pea type or print
1 Check appropnate boxes if: a 0 amends poor report; b ] suspicious transaction
I7M:i Identity of Individual From Whom the Cash Was Received
2 If more than one individual is involved, see instnJctions and check here ..... .I.. .
3 Last name 1 4 First name 5 Middle initial 6 Social security number
7 Address (number. street, and apt. or suite no.) 8 Occupation, profession, or business
9 City 10 State 11 ZIP code 12 Country (if not U.S) 13 Daleot birth (see instructions)
14 Method used to venfy identity: a Descnbe identification .
b Issued by c Number
I,11 Person See Definitions) on Whose Behalf This Transaction Was Conducted
15 If this transaction was conducted on behalf of more than one person, see instructions and check here I Ul
16 This person is an: indivdual or 0 nizaton[17 If funded by another party, see instructions and check here []
18 Individual's last name or 0rganzations same 19 First name 20 Middle initial 21 Social secunty number
22 Doing business as (DBA) name (see instructions) _
Employer identification number
23 Alien identification: a Descnbe identification . .. .
b Issued by a Number
24 Address (number street, and apt. or suite no.) 25 Occupation, profession, or business
26 City 27 State 28 ZIP code 29 Country (if not U S) 30 Date of birth (see instructions)
I',T' I Descrition of Transaction and Method of Payment
31a 0 personal property purchased d 0 business services provided g 0 exchange of cash
b 0 real property purchased e 0 intangible property purchased h 0 escrow or trust funds
c El personal services provided f C debt obligations paid i [I other (specify) •'
32 Specific description of property or service purchased Give serial or registration number of car, boat. airptane, etc, address of real estate etc
33 Total price S 00134 Amount of U S currency received $ 00 35 Amount in $100 bills or larger $ 00
36a Amount of cash received in other than U.S. currency (see instructions) .. ....... I, $ 00
b Specific descnption of cash received in other than U.S. currency ...................... ....... .
37 If part of an installment sale, give information below and check box. ..... 0 38 Date of transacton
a Number of payments - bAmount of each payment $ 0 .
c Frequency' monthly [ other (describe) d Balloon payment (amount) $ 00
17WMIL'I Business Reporting This Transaction
39 Name of reporting business 40 Employer identification number
41 Street address (number and street) where transaction occurred Social secunty number
42 City 43 State 144 ZIP code 45 Nature of your business
46 Under penalties of perjury. I declare that to the best of my knowledge the information I have furnished above is true. correct,
and complete.
Sign
Here _ )
(Authorized signature-See instructions) (Title) (Date signed) gelephone number
(Type or pont signer's name betow) of business)
For 8300 m" 2-92)Cat No 62?133S
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P"e 2
Multiple Parties
(Complete appicable parts below if box 2 or 15 on page 1 is checked
~ Continued-Complete if box 2 on page 1 is checked
3 Last name j 4 First name 5 Middle initial 1 6 Social security number
7 Address (number, street, and apt or sute no) 8 Occupation, profession, or business
9 City 10 State 11 ZIP code 12 Country (if not U.S.) 13 Date of birth (see instructions)
14 Method used to verily identity a Descnbe identification I . ............... ........
b Issued by c Number
3 Last name 4 First name 5Middle initial 6 Social secunty number
7 Address (number. street. and apt. or suite no) 8 Occupation, profession, or business
9 City 10 State 11 Z(P code 12 Co
u
ntry (if not U.S.) 13 Date o
f 
birth (see in
st r
ctions)
14 Method used to verify identity a Describe identification • . ..........
b Issued by c Number
Continued-Complete if box 15 on page I is checked
16 Tn a person is an E] indivdual or (" o anizatonT17 If funded by another part, see instructions and check here . U3
18 Iodi,,dual last name or Organicatin's name 19 First name 20 Middle initial 21 Social secunty number
22 Doing business as (OBA) name (see instructions) ] _ _ _ _
Employer identificaton number
23 Alien identification a Descrbe identification ll
b Issued by c Number
24 Address (numbier, street, and apt. or sute no.) 25 Occupation, profession, or business
26 C ty 27 State 28 ZIP code 29 Country (f not U.S.) 30 Date of birth (see nstrudions)
. I I : I ;
16 T,s person is an..m 0 dr dual or 0 organzatonl17 If funded by another party, see instructions and check here . 0 1
18 Ir ,.dual s last nare f Orgainzatorn r ame 19 First name 20 Middle initial 21 Social secunty number
22 Doing business as (DBA) name (see instructions)
Employer identification number
23 Aien identification a Describe identification ll .
b Issued by c Number
24 Address (number. street. and apt or suite no-) 25 Occupation, profession, or business
26 City 27 State 28 ZIP code 29 Country (f not U.S.) 30 Date of birth (see instructions)
I 1 D I : I
f-6c,'r )tO R¢ 2-92,
